Children\u27s Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their  Rights by Hafen, Bruce C.
BYU Law Review
Volume 1976 | Issue 3 Article 1
9-1-1976
Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism:
Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to
Their "Rights"
Bruce C. Hafen
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Family Law Commons
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bruce C. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights", 1976
BYU L. Rev. 605 (1976).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1976/iss3/1
FAMILY LAW SYMPOSIUM 
Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: 
Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to 
Their "Rights" 
Children have a very special place in life which law should 
reflect. Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily 
lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to deter- 
mination of a state's duty toward children. Frankfurter, J., con- 
curring in May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953). 
Bruce C. Hafen* 
After the type for this article had been set, the U S .  Su- 
preme Court decided two cases havingpotential implications for 
the constitutional rights of  minors-Bellotti v. Baird, 44 
U S .  L. W. 5221 (July 1, 1976) and Planned Parenthood of Cen- 
tral Missouri v. Danforth, 44 U.S.L. W. 5197 (July 1, 1976). In  
Belloti, a unanimous Court held that the lower federal court 
should have abstained from determining the constitutionality of 
a state statute requiring parental consent to a n  unmarried 
minor's abortion but providing for judicial order of consent "or 
gotad cause shown" after parental consent is refused. The Court 
found the statute susceptible of an  interpretation by the appro- 
priate state court that would not impose a n  absolute 'parental 
veto" power. Because such an interpretation would "avoid or 
substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge to the 
statute," abstention was held to be appropriate. 
The Planned Parenthood case struck down a state statute 
imposing an "absolute" parental veto power over minors' a bor- 
tion decisions; however, the majority opinion represented the 
views of only three of the nine Justices. There were four dissen- 
ters and the concurring opinion by Justice Stewart (joined by 
Justice Powell) implied that a statutory imposition of parental 
"consent or consultation" requirements short of an uncondi- 
tional veto (such as the Belloti statute might be) could well be 
"constitutionally permissible." 
* Professor of Law, Brigham Young University, B.A., 1966, Brigham Young Uni- 
versity; J.D., 1967, University of Utah. The author acknowledges the valuable assis- 
tance of Eric G. Andersen, Steven G. Johnson, Bruce T.  Reese, and George R. Ryskamp, 
students a t  the J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University; James Lucas, a 
student a t  Columbia Law School, and Lisa Anne Bolin, an undergraduate student a t  
Brigham Young University. 
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The meaning of these decisions is unclear because of the 
uncertainty created by such a split among the members of the 
Court and the variety of potential approaches to parental con- 
sent requirements short of an absolute veto power. However, 
some of the language i n  Mr. Justice Blackmun's majority opin- 
ion in  Planned Parenthood, while representing the views of but 
one-third of the Court, illustrates the serious lack of perspective 
on children's rights issues already reflected in a variety of lower 
court decisions and in  other literature. It is that lack of perspec- 
tive that gave rise to this article. 
I. Introductory Illustration: In re Snyder 
11. Two Traditions on a Collision Course 
A. The Individual Tradition 
1. The Enlightenment and American Democra- 
tization 
2. The exclusion of children from the individual 
tradition 
B. The Family Tradition 
1. Origins 
2. The common law view 
3. Constitutional rights of parents 
4. Parental rights: in whose best interest? 
5. Protection for children within a family tradi- 
tion 
C. When Traditions Collide: The Abolition of Child- 
hood? 
1. The effect of other rights movements 
2. Supreme Court decisions 
3. Lower court interpretations of Supreme Court 
decisions 
111. Abandoning Children to Their Rights: The Risks of 
Uncritical Liberation 
A. Rights of Protection vs. Rights of Choice 
B. The Right of a Child Not To Be Abandoned to His 
"Rights": The Most Basic Right? 
IV. Conclusion 
Current court decisions and law-related writing reflect a 
growing concern with the subject of children's rights, in contexts 
ranging from juvenile courts and child custody disputes to rnat- 
ters of minors' rights to abortions and other forms of medical 
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treatment. Some interest in the topic is attributable to recent 
Supreme Court decisions establishing procedural due process 
standards for proceedings involving minors and establishing First 
Amendment rights for public school pupils. Many of the philo- 
sophical underpinnings of this development, however, do not 
have their origins in the traditional domains of juvenile and fam- 
ily law; rather, policies developed and articulated in the civil 
rights movement and other egalitarian movements it has 
spawned are now being applied to situations involving children. 
Race, sex, and age being three of the most obvious traditional 
categories of discrimination, it  has been only natural to assume 
that if one form of obvious discrimination is unfair, other obvious 
forms of discrimination may be equally unfair. Thus, the 
momentum of recent antidiscrimination movements has provided 
a running start for a children's rights movement. 
This article suggests that serious risks are involved in an 
uncritical transfer of egalitarian concepts from the contexts in 
which they developed to the unique context of family life and 
children. The family life context has a history all its own-a 
history replete with psychological, economic, sociological, and 
political implications. The use of "children's rights" language in 
this day of rights movements offers a way to leap over that history 
and its implications into the realm of abstract ideology. Whether 
that leap is the result of strategy or ignorance, its consequences 
are the same. The most harmful of the potential consequences is 
that the long-range interests of children themselves may be irre- 
parably damaged as the state and parents abandon children to 
their "rights." 
I. INTRODUCTORY ILLUSTRATION: In re Snyder 
Agents of the state, including juvenile court judges, are re- 
stricted in their power to invoke jurisdiction over family disputes 
unless one of a few well-known situations arises: divorce and 
related custody matters; adoption; parental neglect, abuse, or 
abandonment; and juvenile law violations by minors-either 
delinquent acts or status offenses such as ungovernability. Al- 
though many families have voluntarily accepted the advice of 
juvenile court authorities in circumstances approaching one or 
more of these traditional categories, juvenile court judges and 
court-appointed professionals are not viewed as arbitrators em- 
powered to intervene unless the particular circumstances rise to 
the serious level of one of the mentioned categories. The advisory 
intervention that has occurred short of that level has typically 
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been a t  parental request (often a t  the suggestion of a social 
worker), and has virtually never been a t  the request of children 
unless serious parental fitness questions were invoked. Recently, 
however, the merits of parental decisionmaking on general life- 
style subjects have attracted the attention of juvenile court 
judges in new ways. 
A recent case in Washington, for example, raises the possibil- 
ity that children may now be able to secure significant judicial 
intervention into traditional parental prerogatives-including the 
termination of parental custody rights-when there are parent- 
child conflicts over lifestyle preferences. In this case, In re 
Snyder,' a bright, independent 15-year-old girl who had never 
had trouble with the law, but who was antagonistic toward her 
parents, asked a juvenile court to declare her "incorrigible" and 
place her in a foster home. She had lived all her life with her 
natural parents, who were fairly typical middle-class people with 
traditional ideas about the role of parents in disciplining and 
rearing their children. The family had experienced friction be- 
cause of differences of opinion between the parents and the girl 
concerning her dating, her friends, and her desire to smoke. In an 
early phase of the case, the parents were found to be "fit" in the 
statutory sense, so that neither their conduct nor their compe- 
tence was technically at  issue when the incorrigibility question 
subsequently arose. After hearing the basis for the girl's incorrigi- 
bility claim, the juvenile court judge initially thought that it 
would be "improper" for him to "simply accommodate her [the 
girl] by her just saying 'I am incorrigible and I want out.' " He 
went on to state, "I do not think it works that way yet. I think 
these parents are responsible for this girl and I think that it is 
their duty to try to raise her."2 After further consideration, how- 
ever, the judge granted the girl's request, apparently concerned 
that she might otherwise run away from home. On appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Washington, his decision was upheld. 
The Snyder result seems to imply that, even when a family 
problem does not reach the level of traditional juvenile court 
jurisdictional requirements, a dissatisfied child should be permit- 
ted to leave the family a t  her own request when her discontent is 
serious enough to indicate that jurisdictional levels may soon be 
reached and when some stress can be avoided if the court simply 
- pp --- - - 
1. 85 Wash. 2d 182, 532 P.2d 278 (1975), noted i n  Comment, Status Offenses and the 
Status of Children's Rights: Do Children Have the Legal Right To Be IncorrigibIe? 1976 
B.Y.U.L. Rev. 659. 
2. Record, vol. 1, Statement of Facts, a t  82, In re Snyder, 85 Wash. 2d 182,532 P.2d 
278 (1975). 
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moves in. This theory is essentially an argument for the proposi- 
tion that a child should be able to "divorce" (or a t  least achieve 
separation from) his or her parents on grounds of incompatibility. 
Although Snyder is arguably just another family breakdown 
case, the lawyers for the state acknowledged that they had been 
unable to find "applicable case law" governing the facts of the 
case.3 They argued that In re Gault4 suggests the new idea that 
"children are autonomous individuals, entitled to the same rights 
and privileges before the law as  adult^."^ They also cited Foster 
and Freed's proposed "Bill of Rights for Childrenv6 for the propo- 
sition that a child should have the legal right to emancipation 
from the parent-child relationship when that relationship has 
broken down and the child has left home due to . . . serious 
family conflict. "' 
One may wonder just how great a step it is from traditional 
variations on the family breakdown theme to a child-initiated 
request for divorce on simple incompatibility grounds. The step 
requires little stretching if one assumes that, since children are 
people too, they should have some right to choose their own living 
environment. On the other hand, the step becomes a quantum 
leap if one assumes that family life is fundamental and, therefore, 
that state intervention in the parent-child relationship must be 
a last resort. Perhaps only questions of degree are involved, but 
as Justice Holmes once wrote, questions of degree are the only 
ones worth arguing about in the law. Further, these are poten- 
tially watershed questions, representing differing assignments of 
priorities between two significant American traditions- 
individualism and the family. Recent legal and social develop- 
ments suggest that these two traditions may be on a collision 
course. Certain modern conceptions of children's rights, if car- 
ried through to their logical implications, assure that collision. 
Resolving the effects of the collision may be one of the critical 
legal problems of our time. 
3. Brief for State Respondent at 23, In re Snyder, 85 Wash. 2d 182, 532 P.2d 278 
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Brief for State Respondent]. 
4. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
5. Brief for State Respondent at 23, In re Snyder, 85 Wash. 2d 182, 532 P.2d 278 
(1975). 
6. Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAMILY L.Q. 343 (1972). 
7. Id. at 347. 
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11. Two TRADITIONS O  A COLLISION COURSE 
A. The Individual Tradition 
1. The Enlightenment and American democratization 
The writers of the European Enlightenment argued that 
sound political theory must begin with the individual in the ideal- 
ized "state of nature." Government was thought of as the con- 
tractual creation of a collection of such individuals. This notion 
was a revolutionary departure from prevailing ideas about man 
as a creature of the state. Although a t  least one writer made a 
belated attempt to demonstrate that the "state of nature" con- 
cept was nothing more than a clever rhetorical device that hardly 
reflected the legal and cultural origins of Western ~ o c i e t y , ~  these 
beginnings of the philosophy of the individual tradition so cap- 
tured the imagination of European and American thinkers that 
the philosophy became for many a set of self-evident truths. 
Nowhere was that philosophy more influential than in the 
United States. Notions about the natural rights of man, about the 
right of revolution, and of men being created equal may have 
been derived from the a priori reasoning of Europeans, but they 
were not therefore less significant to Americans like Thomas Jef- 
ferson. The philosophical context in which the American Repub- 
lic was created assumed a t  a most fundamental level an individ- 
ual tradition. 
The assumption, however, was not unqualified: 
The eighteenth century republicans who founded the nation 
understood equality in terms of equality among those having 
equal status. Like the constitutionalists of antiquity, they were, 
in the main, not democrats in the sense of extending the rights 
and privileges of citizenship to all  person^.^ 
Even the significant democratization attributed to the Jacksoni- 
ans did not extend to "the abolition of slavery, the emancipation 
of women from legal and political subjection, or the eradication 
8. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1st American .ed 1870). Maine pointed out that under 
the ideal theory of Roman law, the propositioas that "all men are equal" or men are 
entitled to equal protection of the laws had a purely legal (as distinguished from political) 
meaning: to the extent that Roman civil law coincided with a natural law of equality, 
Roman tribunals would have to apply the same law to citizen and foreigner, freeman and 
slave. Id. at  89. Maine observed that beginning in the 14th century and continuing through 
the revolutions in France and England, the concept of equality took on the more political 
meaning that "all men ought to be equal." See id. a t  89-90. The concept then became an 
assumption underlying the hypothetical state of nature. "This," wrote Maine, "is the 
enunciation not of a legal rule but of a political dogma; and from this time the equality 
of men is spoken of by the French lawyers just as if it were a political truth which 
happened to have been preserved among the archives of their science." Id. at 90. 
9. 1 B. SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 3 (1970). 
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of all constitutional discriminations based on wealth, race, or 
condition of servitude."1° Only after the Civil War was "equality" 
introduced into the Constitution in the form of the equal protec- 
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Gradually, the voting franchise was extended, women's 
rights were more widely recognized, and American political insti- 
tutions were increasingly democratized. But the Reconstruction 
statutes did not guarantee equality in fact, and from 1875 until 
1957 there was no new federal civil rights legislation-perhaps 
because there was little public concern with equality for disad- 
vantaged classes. Then, given great impetus by Brown v. Board 
of Educationl1 in 1954, a serious movement for racialBquality was 
born. That movement grew into an irresistable appeal to the na- 
tional conscience that culminated in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
The relative success of the civil rights movement generated other 
movements seeking greater equality for women and minority 
groups. The current high level of interest in these movements 
makes it easy to forget how recently they have come to the na- 
tion's attention. Nevertheless, the individual tradition in 
America has seldom been more broadly alive than it is today. 
2. The exclusion of children from the individual tradition 
In 1861, Sir Henry Maine observed that the movement to- 
ward individualism was changing the role of both slaves and 
women.12 Children, however, had not been included in the theo- 
retical formulations that gave birth and growth to democratic 
concepts; nor were they included in any pre-1960 applications 
and extensions of those concepts. Some of the early writings 
about individual liberty were explicit about the reasons for ex- 
cluding children. Viewing their position as a matter of legal 
theory, Maine noted that "[children] before years of discretion" 
were classified with "the adjudged lunatic" because "they do not 
possess the faculty of forming a judgment on their own interests; 
in other words . . . they are wanting in the first essential of an 
engagement by Contract. "13 
For John Locke, limited capacity necessarily excluded mi- 
nors from participation in the Social Contract. He explained in 
some detail why "[clhildren . . . are not born in this state of 
equality, though they are born to it."14 Although Adam was "cre- 
10. Id. at 5. 
11 .  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
12. H. MAINE, supra note 8, at 163-64. 
13. Id. at 164. 
14. J.  LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT # 55 (1952). 
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ated" as a mature person, "capable from the first instant of his 
being to provide for his own support and preservation . . . and 
govern his actions according to the dictates of the law of reason,"15 
children lacked a "capacity of knowing that law."lTarents were 
therefore under an obligation of nature to nourish and educate 
their children to help them attain a mature and rational capacity, 
"till [their] understanding be fit to take the government of 
[their] will."17 "And thus we see how natural freedom and 
subjection to parents may consist together and are both founded 
on the same principle. "18 
John Stuart Mill later addressed the topic in conjunction 
with his classic statement of the libertarian principle: 
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is 
meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their 
faculties. We are not speaking of children or of young persons 
below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or 
womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken 
care of by others must be protected against their own actions as 
well as against external injury. . . . Liberty, as a principle, has 
no application to any state of things anterior to the time when 
mankind have become capable of being improved by free and 
equal discussion. l9 
In this same passage, Mill acknowledged that authoritarian guid- 
ance for the incapacitated was justifiable only as a means of 
bringing them to the necessary point of maturity. 
Locke and Mill did not discriminate arbitrarily on the basis 
of age but rationally on the basis of capacity. Neither would have 
justified discrimination against children once capacity had been 
attained, and Locke particularly saw the parental role (as well as 
the duty of children to their parents) as designed precisely to 
develop mature capacities. 
15. Id. § 56. 
16. Id. 5 59. 
While Locke may have reference to the law of England, his thesis is that children 
are born "ignorant and without the use of reason" and therefore are not "under the law 
of reason." See id. § 57. 
17. Id. § 59. 
18. Id. § 61. Locke was convinced that there was no alternative for children but to 
be subject to their parents. "From this obligation no state, no freedom can absolve chil- 
dren." However, he clearly saw that the parental role was an educational one designed 
for the benefit of the children, and, as such, it did not give parents "a power of command 
over their children, or an authority to make laws and dispose as they please of their 
[children's] lives and liberties." Id. 6 66. 
Locke also saw the capacity problem as the source of limitations on the freedom of 
lunatics and idiots. "And so lunatics and idiots are never set free from the government of 
their parents." Id. § 60. 
19. J.  MILL, ON LIBERTY 13-14 (1956). 
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The law has long assumed the necessity of capacity. The 
assumption is reflected in restrictions on the freedom of children 
to vote, hold office, marry, drive automobiles, shoot firearms, 
gamble, enter into contracts, consent to sexual acts, and to make 
many other binding decisions about their own lives. The pre- 
sumption of minors' incapacity has been so strong that the growth 
of democratic ideals in American society, rather than encouraging 
the "liberation" of children from limitations upon their liberty, 
has encouraged even greater discrimination on the basis of 
age-to protect children from the excesses of their immature fac- 
ulties and to promote the development of their ability ultimately 
to assume responsibility. The juvenile court movement and the 
expansion of compulsory public education are obvious examples 
of the way American democratization has reflected the views of 
Locke and Mill about protecting and developing the capacities of 
the 
B. The  Family Tradition 
1. Origins 
Philippe AriBs' classic work on the history of the Western 
family-more particularly the history of ~hildhood~~-is fre- 
quently cited for the idea that childhood is a relatively recent 
social invention. Thus, it has been argued that a family tradition 
which includes a legal concept of minority status does not reflect 
a natural condition, and that assumptions about the limited ca- 
pacities of minors may represent vested parental interests rather 
than a fact of nature.22 Primarily by reference to iconographic 
sources, AriBs documents that medieval children were typically 
absorbed into the working world of adults a t  about the age of 
seven.23 The concept of a longer childhood emerged gradually 
with the coming of the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the 
Industrial Revolution. 
One is not justified, however, in concluding from Ariks' work 
20. Even with the American commitment to shielding children from their own imma- 
turity, American sociologist Seymour Lipset has documented some revealing accounts 
reflecting the influence of egalitarian principles on child-rearing in the early history of the 
United States. He notes tha t  foreign visitors have often been shocked by the extent to 
which American children have been "treated like rational beings," to the creating of a 
"dictatorship of the young" in which parents "avoid to the utmost the exercise of author- 
ity, and . . . make children friends from the very beginning." S. LIPSET, THE FIRST NEW 
NATION 119-20 (1963). 
21. P. ARI~S,  CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD (1962). 
22. R. FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS 17-25 (1974). 
23. P. ARI~S,  supra note 21, a t  411. 
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that childhood has been only recently invented. It has, rather, 
been rediscovered. Aries himself notes, in an offhand way, that 
medieval society had lost sight of established Greek and Roman 
concepts about education and childhood: 
Medieval civilization had forgotten the paideia of the ancients 
and knew nothing as yet of modern education. . . . 
. . . The age groups of Neolithic times, the Hellenistic paideia, 
presupposed a difference and a transition between the world of 
children and that of adults, a transition made by means of an 
initiation or an education. Medieval civilization failed to per- 
ceive this difference and therefore lacked this concept of transi- 
tion. 
The great event was therefore the revival, at the beginning 
of modern times, of an interest in education.24 
Both family life and the prolonged education of children 
flourished during the high points of ancient Greek and Roman 
cultures.25 Indeed, it was usually the family that took chief 
responsibility for educating the young. In these greatest of the 
ancient societies, childhood was viewed as a time for obtaining 
the education necessary for responsible entrance into the adult 
community. As the glories of the Roman Empire gave way to the 
Middle Ages, childhood, family, and education all took on drasti- 
cally reduced importance. When Western civilization gradually 
emerged from the darkness of that period, the ancient concept of 
childhood, with its concomitant emphasis on prolonged educa- 
tion, returned. This reappearance was not remarkable in an age 
that sought to emulate the art forms, law, political institutions, 
and philosophy of the Greeks and Romans. 
Sir Henry Maine's Ancient Law attempts to demonstrate 
that ancient Western society began with a primary focus on the 
group, not the individual. According to Maine, the primal group 
was the family. 
[Slociety in primitive times was not what it is assumed to be 
a t  present, a collection of individuals. In fact, and in the view 
of the men who composed it, it was an aggregation of families. 
The contrast may be most forcibly expressed by saying that the 
unit of an ancient society was the Family, of a modern society 
the Individual. 26 
24. Id. at 411-12. 
25. See generally J. CARCOPINO, DAILY LIFE IN ANCIENT ROME (1940); H. JOHNSTON, 
THE PRIVATE LIFE OF THE ROMANS (1903); J. MAHAFFY, SOCIAL IFE IN GREECE FROM HOMER 
TO MENANDER (1902). 
26. H. MAINE, supra note 8, at 121. 
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Maine then hypothesizes that the movement of Western so- 
ciety has been from Status to Contract, arguing that while the 
ancient societies attached legal and social significance to individ- 
ual action primarily as a function of the group or family to which 
the individual belonged, modern society has attributed increased 
significance to individual action.27 Maine's generalization sug- 
gests the steady growth of the individual tradition and its separa- 
tion from the family tradition. The continued movement from 
Status to Contract is reflected in the democratic egalitarianism 
of modern times and the diminished influence of extended family 
kinship ties in today's highly mobile, industrialized society. Still, 
the concept of the nuclear family has continued to influence mod- 
ern thinking to such an extent that children have not yet been 
fully included in the individual tradition. 
Recognition of the family tradition by English and American 
law occurs primarily in cases involving parental rights. Several 
tributaries contribute to a mainstream judicial attitude histori- 
cally favorable to protecting parents' interests in their children. 
The common law and certain constitutional doctrines have devel- 
oped along similar lines. 
2. The common law view 
The common law has long recognized parental rights as a key 
concept, not only for the specific purposes of domestic relations 
law, but as a fundamental cultural assumption about the family 
as a basic social, economic, and political unit. For this reason, 
- 
27. Maine explains his "Status to Contract" theory as follows: 
The movement of the progressive societies has been uniform in one respect. 
Through all its course it has been distinguished by the gradual dissolution of 
family dependency and the growth of individual obligation in its place. The 
individual is steadily substituted for the Family, as the unit of which civil laws 
take account. . . . Nor is i t  difficult to see what is the tie between man and man 
which replaces by degrees those forms of reciprocity in rights and duties which 
have their origin in the Family. I t  is Contract. Starting, as from one terminus 
of history, from a condition of society in which.al1 the relations of Persons are 
summed up in the relations of Family. we seem to have steadily moved towards 
a phase of social order in which all these relations arise from the free agreement 
of individuals. . . . 
The word Status may be usefully employed to construct a formula express- 
ing the law of progress thus indicated . . . . All the forms of Status taken notice 
of in the Law of Persons were derived from, and to some extent are still coloured 
by, the powers and privileges anciently residing in the Family. If then we employ 
Status . . . to signify these personal conditions only, and avoid applying the 
term to such conditions as are the immediate or remote result of agreement, we 
may say that the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a 
movement from Status to Contract. 
Id. a t  163-65. 
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both English and American judges view the origins of parental 
rights as being even more fundamental than property rights." 
Parental rights to custody and control of minor children have 
been variously described as "sacred,"29 as a matter of "natural 
law,"30 and as "inherent, natural right[s], for the protection of 
which, just as much as for the protection of the rights of the 
individual to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, our gov- 
ernment is formed."31 These judicial word choices imply that the 
parent-child relationship antedates the state in much the same 
sense as natural individual rights are thought to antedate the 
state in American political philosophy. It has been said: 
Our political system is superimposed on and presupposes a so- 
cial system of family units, not just of isolatsd individuals. No 
assumption more deeply underlies our society than the assump- 
tion that it is the individual [parent] who decides whether to 
raise a family, with whom to raise a family, and, in broad mea- 
sure, what values and beliefs to inculcate in the children who 
will later exercise the rights and responsibilities of citizens and 
heads of families. . . . 
. . . [Tlhe family unit does not simply co-exist with our 
constitutional system; it is an integral part of it. In democratic 
theory as well as in practice, it is in the family that children are 
expected to learn the values and beliefs that democratic institu- 
tions later draw on to determine group directions. The im- 
mensely important power of deciding about matters of early 
28. Much children's rights literature argues that children should no longer be re- 
garded as the "property" of their parents. For example, Pilpel, Minors' Rights to Medical 
Care, 36 ALBANY L. REV. 462, 463 (1972), states that "the common law regarded children 
largely as the property of their parents," and implies that this view prevailed even until 
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). A similar statement is made by the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1975): "The [common] law did 
not distinguish between the infant and the mature teenager, treating them both as the 
property of their parents, who could make all decisions affecting them." The court also 
implied that this view continued until Gault and Tinker u. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District. Id. at  789-90. The "children-as-chattels" view, however, has 
not in fact been taken seriously for many years, as suggested not only by the cases cited 
in this section, but also by the limitations that have long existed on the exercise of 
parental rights. See notes 89-91 and accompanying text infra. 
29. In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 685, 126 P.2d 765, 771 (1942). 
30. People ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 542, 104 N.E.2d 895, 896 (1952). 
31. Lacher v. Venus, 177 Wis. 558, 569-70, 188 N.W. 613, 617 (1922); c f .  In re Adop- 
tion of Anderson, 235 Minn. 192, 200, 50 N.W.2d 278, 284 (1951), which states: 
Parents who faithfully discharge their parental obligations with assiduity 
and to the full extent of their means and abilities are entitled to the custody of 
their children. Parental rights, however, are not absolute and are not to be 
unduly exalted and enforced to the detriment of the child's welfare and happi- 
ness. 
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socialization has been allocated to the family, not to the govern- 
~ l l e n t . ~ ~  
Parental power is thought to be plenary-prevailing over the 
claims of the state, other outsiders, and the children themselves 
unless there is some compelling justification for interference." 
Such compelling justifications have been recognized for centuries 
where natural parents have abandoned, neglected, or abused 
their children in some way that required state intervention to 
avoid serious harm to the children." Although judicial percep- 
32. Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees; Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 
BOSTON U.L. REV. 765, 772-73 (1973). 
33. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 132- 
33, 131 A. 198, 199 (1925), stated the following concerning the law's regard for parental 
authority: 
Immemorially the family has been an important element of our civil so- 
ciety, one of the supports upon which our civilization has developed. Save as 
modified by the legislature, in domestic affairs the family has remained in law 
a self-governing entity, under the discipline and direction of the father as its 
head. . . . These fundamental principles are traceable to ancient customs and 
usages and are fixed by tradition and evidenced by the decisions of the courts. 
Anything that brings the child into conflict with the father or diminishes the 
father's authority or hampers him in its exercise is repugnant to the family 
establishment and is not to be countenanced save upon positive provisions of 
the statute law. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Mississippi stated: 
The kind and extent of education, moral and intellectual, to be given to a 
child and the mode of furnishing it are left largely to the discretion of the parents 
. . . . Unless shown to the contrary, the presumption is that natural parents 
will make the best decisions for their offspring. 
. . . .  
. . . [Tlhis important parental right is protected by common-law princi- 
ples. It is also a right protected by the due process clauses of the Federal and 
State Constitutions. . . . 
. . . .  
The family is the basis 0.f our society. [The parent in this case] has an 
interest in [the education of his children] which lies on a different plane than 
that of mere property. Moreover, a child has no higher welfare than to be reared 
by a parent who loves him and who has not forfeited the right of custody. The 
agencies of our democratic government are obligated to preserve that right, 
which is not recognized in a totalitarian society. 
In re Guardianship of Faust, 239 Miss. 299, 305-07, 123 So. 2d 218, 220-21 (1960). 
34. Blackstone mentioned England's historical limitations on parental authority in 
the following statement: 
The ancient Roman laws gave the father a power of life and death over his 
children; upon this principle, that he who gave had also the power of taking 
away. But the rigor of these laws was softened by subsequent constitutions 
. . . .  
The power of a parent, by our English laws, is much more moderate; but 
still sufficient to keep the child in order and obedience. He may lawfully correct 
his child, being under age, in a reasonable manner; for this is for the benefit of 
his education. 
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tions of abuse and neglect have varied over time, American courts 
and legislatures have expressed increasingly lower tolerance for 
serious physical harms inflicted by parents on their children. 
Some authorities have suggested that in more modern times 
(the 20th century) the interests of parents in claims to custody 
and control have been limited by increased emphasis on "a social 
interest in the protection of dependent p e r s ~ n s . " ~ ~ i m i l a r l y  
broad statements have been made about "the waning of parental 
rights"36 in British Commonwealth countries; however, such 
statements actually refer to increased limitations on the rights of 
biological parents in situations where the normal parent-child 
relationship has already been interfered with by the application 
of traditional criteria giving rise to custody disputes or parental 
neglect claims. The criteria themselves have undergone no signif- 
icant change. The domain of parental discretion has also been 
modestly limited within the last century by increased state con- 
cern with such specific subjects as child labor and public educa- 
tion, attention to various categories of child behavior classified 
under juvenile delinquency laws, continued extension of the cir- 
cumstances under which emergency medical treatment may be 
given to children, and a greater judicial commitment to the best 
interests of children involve$ in custody disputes. 
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES "451 (emphasis added). 
A 19th century English court enunciated the justifications for judicial interference in 
parental authority: 
A father has a legal right to control and direct the education and bringing 
up of his children until they attain the age of twenty-one years . . . and the 
Court will not interfere with him in the exercise of his paternal authority, except 
(1) where by his gross moral turpitude he forfeits his rights, or (2) where he has 
by his conduct abdicated his paternal authority. 
In re Agar-Ellis, [I8831 24 Ch. D. 317 (C.A.). 
35. Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REV. 177, 182 
(1916). 
36. J. M. Eekelaar begins his article, Deprivation of Parental Rights: Legislative 
Contrasts i n  England, Wales, Australia, and Canada, 7 FAMILY L.Q. 381 (1973), with this 
statement: "One of the outstanding features of the twentieth century development of the 
law relating to children has been the emergence of the doctrine which promotes the child's 
welfare over parental rights." As support for this premise, Eekelaar refers to an article by 
Hall, The Waning of Parental Rights, 31 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 248 (1972), which briefly docu- 
ments that a gradual erosion of parental rights during this century is due to "the ever- 
increasing concern of society for the well-being of its youngest members." An examination 
of the cases cited by Hall reveals, however, that the only changes he identifies are modifi- 
cations in judicial attitudes when the custody of a child or the rights of parents have 
already been called into question. At this point the "best interests of the child" standard 
has been given increasing recognition over the bare legal claim of a natural parent who 
may have relinquished practical custody in some obvious way. There is no evidence from 
these authorities that there has been any recognizable change in the criteria initially 
giving rise to an inquiry about child custody, such as parental neglect, abandonment, 
divorce, or other custody disputes. 
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Still, the most fundamental legal aspects of the parent-child 
relationship, including the.  basic presumption favoring custody 
and control by parents in relatively normal family situations, 
have remained unchanged. Indeed, many aspects of the juvenile 
court movement have probably strengthened traditional assump- 
tions favoring parental custody rights.37 One authority has re- 
cently stated, "[tlhe truth of the matter is that there has been 
no radical change in the child's situation in American law or 
indeed in the thinking about his condition for over a ~ e n t u r y ? ~  
3. Constitutional rights of parents 
A series of Supreme Court opinions has addressed the subject 
of parental prerogatives in a number of contexts and appears to 
have established a strong presumption favoring parental control, 
a t  least as against intervention from the state. Because the Su- 
preme Court has not yet dealt directly with a conflict between 
parental rights and alleged children's rights, however, it is un- 
clear whether the pro-parent decisions arise from concerns about 
protecting children from the excesses of state interference with 
their lives or from efforts to affirm a constitutional doctrine that 
there is some separate parental right.39 
Many of the cases state clearly that parental rights warrant 
constitutional protection based upon established cultural prefer- 
ences for parent-directed family life. The effect of these cases is 
to create both constitutional protections for parents and constitu- 
tional limitations on the state's role in child-rearing. In Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters,4o a case striking down an Oregon compulsory 
37. Relatively recent modernizations of state juvenile court statutes typically contain 
statutory-purpose sections stating explicit legislative preferences for parental custody and 
family support. For example, the Illinois Juvenile Court Act states the following purpose: 
The purpose of this Act is to secure for each minor subject hereto such care and 
guidance, preferably in his own home, as will serve the moral, emotional, men- 
tal, and physical welfare of the minor . . . ; to preserve and strengthen the 
minor's family ties whenever possible, removing him from the custody of his 
parents only when his welfare or safety or the protection of the public cannot 
be adequately safeguarded without removal. . . . 
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-2 (1973). See also CAL. WELF. & INST'NS. CODE § 726 (West 
1972); UTAH CODE ANN. 5 55-10-63 (1953). 
38. S. KATZ, THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, Introduction (1974). 
39. Thus, the question has recently been asked whether Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 
205 (1972) and other cases discussed in this section of the text "mean that parents have a 
constitutionally sanctioned role in their children's lives; or does it mean that the state has 
a constitutionally limited role in child-rearing that typically, but not necessarily, is en- 
forced by deference to the parents?" See Burt, Developing Constitutional Rights of, in and 
for Children, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 118 (1975). 
40. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
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education statute which in effect precluded attendance at private 
schools, Justice McReynolds expressed what was later called in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder "a charter of the rights of parents to direct 
the religious upbringing of their ~hildren."~' He stated that 
"[tlhe child is not the mere creature of the State; those who 
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with 
the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obliga- 
t i o n ~ . " ~ ~  The Court in Yoder then made this broad statement: 
The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong 
tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of 
their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbring- 
ing of their children is now established beyond debate as an 
enduring American tradition.43 
In Meyer v. Nebraska, a 1923 decision invalidating a state 
statute tha t  prohibited foreign language instruction to young 
schoolchildren, the Court said that a teacher's right to teach a 
foreign language "and the right of parents to engage him so to 
instruct their children" are protected by the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.44 Meyer rejected the state claim 
that patriotism and good citizenship would be advanced by en- 
suring that English would be the mother tongue of all children 
raised in the state. Acknowledging the right of German-speaking 
parents in an American community to have their children taught 
German, the Court referred expressly to the social structure dis- 
cussed in Plato's Republic, in which family life was to be replaced 
entirely by state child-rearing activities so pervasive that "no 
parent is to know his own child, nor any child his parent."45 
Regarding this system, the Court stated: 
Although such measures have been deliberately approved by 
men of great genius, their ideas touching the relation between 
individual and State were wholly different from those upon 
which our institutions rest; and i t  hardly will be affirmed that 
any legislature could impose such restrictions upon the people 
of a State without doing violence to both letter and spirit of the 
Con~titution.~" 
41. 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972). 
42. 268 U S .  at  535. 
43. 406 U.S. at 232. 
44. 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). 
45. 262 U.S. at  401-02. 
46. Id. a t  402. Because Meyer involved the prosecution of a private schoolteacher 
rather than a parent, this language might be regarded as dicta. However, the case also 
involved the larger question of how much liberty foreign-born parents should have to 
influence their children with the customs, attitudes, and language of their native culture. 
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In stating that the ideas of those who would have removed 
the interposition of the family between the individual and the 
state were "wholly different from those upon which our institu- 
tions rest," the Court seems to have acknowledged that our cul- 
ture presupposes a system of family units, not just a mass of 
isolated  individual^.^' 
In Ginsberg v. New Y ~ r k , ~ ~  the Court upheld a New York 
statute making it unlawful to sell pornographic magazines to per- 
sons under 17 years of age. The Court identified two justifications 
for the statutory restrictions. First, "Constitutional interpreta- 
tion has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to author- 
ity in their own household to direct the rearing of their children 
is basic in the s$ructure of our society."4g Second, "[tlhe state 
also has an independent interest in the well-being of its youth."5o 
Because parental control cannot always be provided, the Court 
acknowledged that the second rationale justified regulation of the 
availability of pornographic materials to juveniles on standards 
more stringent than those that  govern distribution to adults. 
Since the Court might have disposed of Ginsberg solely by refer- 
ence to the state's interest in protecting the welfare of its youth, 
the explicit recognition of parental authority as a separate justifi- 
cation suggests that the Constitution contemplates a direct role 
for parents in the lives of their children-a role distinct from the 
state-child relationship. 
One of the strongest statements about independent parental 
interests was made in Stanley v. I l l in~ i s ,~ '  in which the Court 
struck down a state statute providing that illegitimate children, 
upon the death of their mother, become wards of the state with- 
out a hearing on the parental fitness of the father. In holding that 
the Fourteenth Amendment entitled the father to a hearing, the 
Court stated: 
The private interest here, that of a man in the children he 
has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent 
a powerful contervailing interest, protection. I t  is plain that the 
interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and 
47. Contrary to this conclusion, Professor Burt seems to think that the Court's refer- 
ence to "the relation between the individual and State," together with the fact that a 
parent was not a party to the litigation in Meyer suggests that the Court was talking about 
the relationship between the state and individuals, not the relationship between the state 
and parents or families. Burt, supra note 39. 
48. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
49. Id. at 639. 
50. Id. at 640. 
51. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
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management of his or her children "come[s] to this Court with 
a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liber- 
ties which derive merely from shifting economic arrange- 
m e n t ~ . ' ' ~ ~  
The authorities cited for this proposition included Meyer and 
Prince v. Massachusetts, 53 from which the following language was 
cited: "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture 
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function 
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can 
neither supply nor hinder."54 The Court recognized in Stanley 
that the children would suffer from uncertainty and dislocation 
under the arrangement proposed by the state, but it was to the 
interest of the parent, not to the interest of the children, that the 
Court directed its attention. 
An authority cited by the Stanley Court contrasting a par- 
ent's interest in his children with an "economic" interest offers 
some rebuttal to the oft-cited but inaccurate statement that, 
until the Gault case in 1967, children were regarded as the "prop- 
erty" of their parents.55 The Stanley Court quoted the 1953 deci- 
sion of May v. Anderson, which referred to parental custody 
rights as "[rlights far more precious . . . than property  right^."^" 
A similar distinction elevating the right of parental custody 
and control beyond the level of property rights was also made in 
Just ice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold v. 
C o n n e ~ t i c u t : ~ ~  
Certainly the safeguarding of the home does not follow merely 
from the sanctity of property rights. The home derives its 
preeminence as the seat of family life. And the integrity of that 
life is something so fundamental that i t  has been found to draw 
to its protection the principles of more than one explicitly 
granted Constitutional right . . . . 
The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that 
clearly underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the 
rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise a family are of 
similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifi- 
cally protected. 
52. Id. at 651. 
53. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
54. 405 U.S. at 651. 
55. See note 28 supra. 
56. 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953)(custody dispute between divorced parents of minor chil- 
dren). 
57. 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (right of access of married persons to contraceptive 
information and devices given constitutional protection). 
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This language from Griswold introduces another line of Su- 
preme Court cases that construes the right to marital privacy and 
the right to raise a family as "fundamental." This line of cases 
includes Skinner v. O k l a h ~ r n a , ~ ~  in which a state statute provid- 
ing for the sterilization of habitual criminals was struck down 
because it threatened the right of "marriage and procreation," 
which the Court found to be "one of the basic civil rights of man," 
and "fundamental to the very existence and survival of the 
race."59 and in Eisenstadt v. B~ird,~O the Court extended to un- 
married persons the privacy protection given married persons in 
Griswold by holding unconstitutional a state statute that prohib- 
ited the distribution of contraceptives to single persons. The 
Eisenstadt Court explicitly acknowledged that the right to be free 
from governmental intrusion on matters as private as the decision 
whether to have a child is the right of an individual, married or 
single, rather than a right granted to a married couple as an 
independent entity? 
One additional line of Supreme Court cases helpful in defin- 
ing the nature and limits of constitutionally protected parental 
rights is that dealing with state attempts to regulate the educa- 
tion and religious activity of children. Both Meyer and Pierce 
arose within this subject area. The general principles established 
by these cases6* were limited somewhat in Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 63 wherein the Court sustained the conviction of an 
adult member of a Jehovah's Witness family for violating a state 
law prohibiting street solicitation by certain minors. The Court 
rejected Mrs. Prince's claim that the conviction violated her due 
process rights to raise the children for whom she was responsible 
as well as the freedom of religion claim exerted on behalf of the 
child involved, a 9-year-old girl who had enthusiastically volun- 
teered to go with her guardian to assist in selling religious litera- 
ture on a public street. The Court acknowledged the conflict be- 
tween the state's claims and the "sacred private interests" asso- 
ciated with the parental claim, but held that, under its parens 
58. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
59. Id. at  541. 
60. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
61. Id. at  453. Of course the marital privacy cases involved considerations other than 
the right to bear children and have their custody once they are born. These cases also 
provided basic authority for the ab~r t ion  decisions, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and 
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), which extended the "fundamental right" of privacy 
to women confronted with a decision whether to submit to an abortion. 
62. See notes 40-47 and accompanying text supra. 
63. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
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patriae authority, the state had a duty to limit parental control 
by requiring school attendance, regulating child labor, and other- 
wise protecting children against the evils of employment and 
other activity in public places." The gist of the Court's view is 
captured in its statement that "[plarents may be free to become 
martyrs themselves. But it does not follow [that] they are free 
. . . to make martyrs of their children before they have reached 
the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that 
choice for themsel~es ."~~ 
Prince makes it clear that there are limits (unrelated to basic 
parental fitness) to the authority of parents to control the educa- 
tional and religious activities of their children. Nonetheless, 
Prince was significantly narrowed in 1972 by Wisconsin v. 
Yoder," which upheld parental claims, based on grounds of both 
religious freedom and parental rights, to exempt children from 
state compulsory education laws as applied to children beyond 
the eighth grade. Writing for the Yoder majority, Chief Justice 
Burger noted that prior case law had limited the Prince doctrine 
~ubs tan t i a l ly .~~  Yoder indicated that the state may not interfere 
with First Amendment freedoms of parents unless there is "harm 
to the physical or mental health of the child or to the public 
safety, peace, order, or welfare."68 Yoder thus circumscribes state 
interference with parental control considerably more than Prince. 
The removal of children from obligations imposed by compulsory 
education laws (even if only after the eighth grade) would seem 
to portend a greater impact on youthful minds and choices than 
an afternoon of selling religious literature on a streetcorner. 
The freedom of parents to impose their values upon their 
children as part of their overall discretion in child-rearing was 
enunciated in both Meyer and Pierce, limited in Prince, and then 
broadly reaffirmed in Yoder, at  least when the parental prefer- 
ence is associated with a religious belief.69 The religious freedom 
claim was explicitly buttressed by Yoder's references to Pierce 
and to the "history and culture of Western Civilization [which] 
reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and 
upbringing of their children."'O 
- -- -- 
64. Id. a t  166. 
65. Id. a t  170. 
66. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
67. Id. a t  230. 
68. Id. 
69. Chief Justice Burger implied that he might have taken another view of the situa- 
tion in Yoder if the Court had not been persuaded that the claims of the Amish parents 
were genuinely religious. Id. a t  235-36. 
70. Id. a t  232. 
6051 RESERVATIONS ABOUT CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 625 
Under the Yoder test, parental discretion will be interfered 
with, not when parental choices deviate from the mainstream of 
public opinion or the views of state authorities, but only "if it 
appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or 
safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social bur- 
den~."~ '  As an example of the kind of fact situation in which such 
jeopardy might arise, Yoder cites the Georgetown College case,72 
where a federal court of appeals upheld a lower court order that 
a blood transfusion be given to a Jehovah's Witness patient who, 
along with her husband, had been unwilling to consent to the 
transfusion. It may be noted that this limitation on parental au- 
thority is consistent with the common law limitations discussed 
earlier. 73 
The dissent of Justice Douglas in Yoder has been widely 
quoted by children's rights advocates because of Douglas' concern 
that Yoder imposed the religious views of parents upon their chil- 
dren." The majority opinion dealt specifically with the questions 
raised by Justice Douglas and concluded that it  was in fact the 
right of the parents that was a t  stake in the case.75 
The common law and constitutional developments concern- 
ing parental rights are mutually reinforcing and arrive at the 
same basic posture-children should be subject to the custody 
and control of their natural parents until the parents' conduct 
falls below the minimum standards established in such areas as 
neglect and abandonment, or until the parents propose to subject 
the child to some action that would interfere with his or her 
71. Id. at  234. 
72. Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 
(D.C. Cir. 1964). 
73. See notes 33-34 and accompanying text supra. 
74. Douglas stated: 
On this important and vital matter of education, I think the children should 
be entitled to be heard. While the parents, absent of dissent, normally speak 
for the entire family, the education of the child is a matter on which the child 
will often have decided views. . . . 
. . . It is the student's judgment, not his parents', that is essential if we 
are to give full meaning to what we have said about the Bill of Rights and of 
the rights of students to be the masters of their own destiny. 
406 U.S. at  244-45 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
75. Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the majority, stated: 
Contrary to the suggestion of the dissenting opinion . . . our holding today 
in no degree depends on the assertion of the religious .interest of the child as 
contrasted with that of the parents. I t  is the parents who are subject to prosecu- 
tion here for failing to cause their children to attend school, and it is their right 
of free exercise, not that of their children, that must determine Wisconsin's 
power to impose criminal penalties on the parent. 
Id. a t  230-31. 
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health or safety. The pro-parent presumption is rebuttable. But 
its rebuttal is not dependent upon the relative quality of parents' 
child-rearing practices, at  least not until that quality reaches 
some almost obvious extremes. Our society and its children are 
not infrequently required to bear difficult burdens as part of the 
price we pay for this degree of parental leeway. To this point in 
our history, the price has not seemed too high. 
4. Parental rights: in whose best interest? 
In spite of the widespread agreement on general principles 
that emerges from the common law and constitutional decisions, 
few of the cases shed much light on the reasons why parental 
rights have been recognized for so many years.'" question that 
naturally arises is whether these principles protect some interest 
of parents independent of the social, psychological, or other inter- 
ests of children that flow from the family autonomy tradition. 
This question is relevant because, if all that matters is what is 
most advantageous to a particular child, perhaps state interven- 
tion in parent-child relationships should be more readily allowed 
than it is under existing law and practices. 
The language chosen by many of the judges who have dealt 
with parental interest issues, however, suggests that more is at  
stake than the welfare of children." The Supreme Court in Meyer 
v. Nebraska selected the right "to establish a home and bring up 
children" along with "the right[s] . . . to contract, to engage in 
any of the common occupations of life . . . [and] to worship God 
76. Some relatively obvious social interests are served by the general discharge by 
parents of their duties toward their children as a concomitant of their rights to control 
and care for them. Whether viewed as parental rights or simply as family autonomy, some 
sense of parental sovereignty has been thought necessary in order to reinforce the responsi- 
bility that must be assumed by parents for maintenance of the social order. Roscoe Pound 
pointed out that the law should refrain from securing too vigorously the interests of 
children against their parents because of what would follow if any incentive were available 
to minors to abandon their family home rather than submit to necessary parental disci- 
pline. Thus, "a child impatient of parental authority might be incited to set at  naught 
all reasonable domestic control by holding over his father's head the alternative of allow- 
ing him his way at home, or of paying for his support abroad. Accordingly it  has been said 
that no one shall take it upon him to dictate to a parent what clothing a child should wear, 
a t  what time it  shall be purchased, or of whom. All that must be left to the discretion of 
the father or mother." Ramsey v. Ramsey, 121 Ind. 215, 217, 23 N.E. 69,70 (1889), quoted 
in Pound, supra note 35, at  186-87. 
In addition to ensuring domestic control, our assumptions about parental authority 
have been thought necessary to ensure the fulfillment of basic functions served by the 
family that are necessary for the continuance of our culture. Such functions include the 
processes that involve socializing children as well as providing for their biological, psychol- 
ogical, and economic needs. See S. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL: THE LAW'S RESPONSE TO 
FAMILY BREAKDOWN ch. 1 (1971). 
77. See notes 28-31 and accompanying text supra. 
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according to the dictates of [one's] own conscience" as a few of 
the most obvious illustrations of the meaning of "liberty," as the 
term is used in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment.78 Similarly, the Court in Stanley u. Illinois included within 
the protections of the due process clause "the interest of a parent 
in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or 
her children. "79 
The right of parents to bring suits against third parties for 
alienation of the affections of their children has been recognized 
within the limited categories of relational interests protected by 
common law tort actions.80 Parents may also recover for injuries 
to that relational interest under most wrongful death statutes, 
just as children may recover under those statutes for the death 
of a parent? The existence of a significant economic interest does 
not satisfactorily explain these statutes. Corporations, for exam- 
ple, do not have a protected relational interest in their "key men" 
sufficient to justify a wrongful death action, even though the 
economic damage to a corporation through the loss of a key man 
may be of greater economic detriment than the loss by a family 
of its breadwinner. Similarly, the associational or companionship 
interest within families is valued in common law tort actions 
while that same interest is not protected as between close friends. 
That particular distinction may be influenced somewhat by the 
difficulties inherent in proving who one's friends are, but it is still 
a meaningful way of demonstrating the peculiar recognition given 
by the law to the uniqueness of intrafamily relational interests. 
A recent Eighth Circuit decision acknowledges interests of 
this kind in recognizing the standing of a father to bring a civil 
rights action against police officers who had shot and killed his 
son.82 In concluding that the killing invaded the father's "consti- 
tutionally protected rights under the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, "83 apart from the father's claims under 
wrongful death statutes, the court cited Meyer and Griswold, 
78. 262 U.S. at 399. 
79. 405 U.S. at 651. The Court cited three of its earlier decisions as authority for 
protecting the parental interest-a due process case, an equal protection case, and a Ninth 
Amendment case. 
80. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 124 (4th ed. 1971). 
81. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-6 (1953): "[A] father, or in case of his death 
or desertion of his family, the mother, may maintain an action for the death or injury of 
a minor child when such injury or death is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another 
9 , 
. . . .  
82. Mattis v. Schnarr, 502 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1974). 
83. Id. at 593. 
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saying: "The familial relationship between parent and child is 
fundamental to our civilization," and "[tlhe practical effect of 
[the shooting by the policeman] was to deny the plaintiff the 
fundamental right to raise his 
It is quite possible that when family life is involved, some 
natural law attitudes linger, even in this age of sociological juris- 
prudence. Thomas Aquinas wrote that one of the most obvious 
examples of the operation of natural law is the education of one's 
own offspring? Men and women in most cultures have long 
viewed their offspring as somehow being an extension of them- 
selves, and as more than mere "property." The bearing and rais- 
ing of children has probably brought people into contact with 
some sense of the Infinite, the mysteries of the universe, or Na- 
ture-however one may express it-more than any other human 
experience. Thus, it is not surprising that common law judges 
refer to parental interests as "sacred," "natural," or "fundamen- 
tal" rights, especially when the constitutional standard for a 
"fundamental" right is whatever judges find when they 
look to the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our peo- 
ple" to determine whether a principle is "so rooted [there] . . . 
as to be ranked as fundamental." The inquiry is whether a right 
involved "is of such character that it cannot be denied without 
violating those -'fundamental principles of liberty and justice 
which lie a t  the base of all our civil and political institutions' 
. . . . 
"86 
This search for fundamental rights is thought by some scholars 
to be in the nature of a search for natural law? 
Some special interest of parents (distinct from the welfare of 
their children) has been and should be the subject of legal and 
constitutional protections. What the parental interest may 
mean-especially where it is pitted against the interests of chil- 
dren-remains to be developed more fully. Nevertheless, the well- 
established cultural assumption favoring parental interests re- 
- - 
84. Id. a t  594, 595. The court added, "We believe that 'parenthood is a substantial 
interest of surpassing value and protected from deprivation without due process of law'-a 
fundamental legal right." Id. a t  595. 
85. T. AQUINAS, UMMA THEOLOGICA, TREATISE ON LAW, Question 94, in THE GREAT 
LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 67 (1959). 
86. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citation 
omitted). 
87. See Dixon, The "New" Substantive Due Process and the Democratic Ethic: A 
Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV. 43; Kauper, The Higher Law and the Rights of Man 
in a Revolutionary Society (AEI's Distinguished Lecture Series on the Bicentennial 1974). 
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quires that the interests of children not be the only factor weighed 
when considering the state-family relationship. 
Furthermore, as discussed more fully below,RS the evidence 
suggests that the maintenance of parental interests within a fam- 
ily tradition is also in the best interests of children. 
5. Protection for children within a family tradition 
As suggested above, the family tradition has not been insen- 
sitive to the need for protecting children against potential abuse 
by parents or others who might be in a position to exploit their 
limited capacities. Although there is some dispute about the phil- 
osophical origins of the common law right of children to be pro- 
tected from parental neglect, abuse, or a b a n d ~ n m e n t , ~ ~  the begin- 
nings of such rights were recognized-at least theoretically-in 
Blackstone's day.g0 Protections against child abuse and other 
forms of parental unfitness have grown until today they represent 
fundamental limitations on parental rights. Statutes proscribing 
various forms of parental misconduct are found in every state,g1 
with remedies ranging from supervision of parental custody to 
criminal prosecution and permanent termination of parental 
rights. 
Significantly, protections against parental unfitness exist as 
part of the family tradition. Parental authority per se is not ques- 
tioned, but only its abuse. Forms of protection for children consis- 
tent with, or part of, the family tradition may be found in such 
developments as child labor laws, the growing breakdown of in- 
trafamily tort immunity, statutory recognition for the preferences 
of minors involved in custody disputes, the emergence of favora- 
ble tort doctrines applicable to child trespassers, and the mainte- 
nance of rights entitling minors to inherit and own property and 
to be parties to litigation (albeit through adult representatives). 
Such developments reflect continuing awareness of the special 
needs of children. 
The family tradition has developed its own balance between 
88. Notes 146-58 and accompanying text infra. 
89. Compare Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and The 
State, 4 FAMILY L.Q. 410, 411-12 (1970) (Aristotle is the source for the theory that the 
purpose of parental control is the welfare of the child rather than the welfare of others in 
society or benefit to the parent) with Kelly, On Some Changes in the Legal Status of the 
Child Since Blackstone, 13 INT'L REV. 83,90,91 (1882) (protection of the child is a natural 
right inherent in the child), in THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (1974). 
90. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *450. 
91. See Katz, Howe & McGrath, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAMILY L.Q. 1 
(1975). 
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the rights of parents and the rights of children; its purpose is to 
support the family as an institution and at the same time provide 
state protection for children where parental authority is abused. 
The juvenile court system, which has had the responsibility of 
balancing children's and parents' rights, has produced its share 
of disappointments, but even after the close scrutiny given it in 
Gault and its progeny, its unique contributions are still highly 
valued. This system, together with the common law and constitu- 
tional doctrines that have been developed in the family law con- 
text, contain at least the conceptual tools for accommodating the 
competing claims and needs of parents and children. Thus, the 
notion of "children's rights" is neither as original nor as recent 
as it may sound. 
C. When Traditions Collide: The Abolition of Childhood? 
As indicated above, children have not been part of the indi- 
vidual tradition. They have, however, been very much a part of 
a family tradition intended to prepare them for entry into the 
individual tradition. The fairness of maintaining that relation- 
ship between the two traditions has gone unquestioned for years. 
However, since the civil rights movement and recent Supreme 
Court decisions giving constitutional dimensions to certain rights 
for children, new questions have been raised. 
1. The effect of other rights movements 
One significant fact about the civil rights movement of the 
1950's and '60's is the extent to which it involved students and 
other concerned citizens from all parts of the country. Such par- 
ticipation contributed materially in bringing the concerns of the 
movement to the nation's attention. It also exposed a large num- 
ber of people already characterized by a strong social conscience 
to the plight of disadvantaged groups. Thus, many of the same 
persons who cut the teeth of their social activism in the civil 
rights movement were later attracted to other social action 
causes. It was no coincidence, then, that rising concern about 
poverty and discrimination against ethnic minority groups and 
women followed so closely on the heels of the civil rights move- 
ment.92 
Civil rights workers recognized early that poverty was a sig- 
92. See generally Freeman, The Origins of the Women's Liberation Movement, 78 
AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 792 (1973). 
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nificant impediment in the path toward equality of opportunity. 
The effects of poverty and racial discrimination seemed espe- 
cially harsh when visited upon the children of disadvantaged 
families. As a result, a specific concern about the needs and rights 
of those children emerged within the context of larger  concern^.^" 
The peculiar needs of disadvantaged children were more a func- 
tion of the widespread impact of racial discrimination and pov- 
erty than of discrimination against children per se. Nevertheless, 
the social and political powerlessness of disadvantaged families 
seemed especially poignant when considered from the viewpoint 
of the children within those families, who lacked ability to change 
their circumstances not only because of their minority or eco- 
nomic status, but also because of their childhood. 
Increased public awareness of the damage caused to mem- 
bers of minority groups by cultural deprivation and other forms 
of discrimination also increased public concern about child abuse 
and neglect. The inability of children to defend themselves 
against such parental failures has made it logical to view them 
as another class of victims being harmed by the exploitation of 
those holding a position of relative power and advantage. 
The recognition of disadvantage and discrimination in these 
circumstances has made irresistible the inclination to lump chil- 
dren together with other disadvantaged classes who are struggling 
for their own kind of liberation. I t  has been said that the civil 
rights movement and the various liberation efforts that have fol- 
lowed it have made the nation begin "to see the necessity for 
children's l ibe ra t i~n . "~~  One advocate of a general children's lib- 
eration movement has written that "the arguments for and 
against perpetuation of [minority] status have a familiar ring. 
In good measure they are the same arguments that were advanced 
over the issues of slavery and the emancipation of married 
women. "95 Another has echoed, "[tlhe child's subjugated status 
was rooted in the same benevolent despotism that kings, hus- 
bands, and slave masters claimed as their moral right."96 
As a result of this conceptual consolidation, many of the 
arguments for granting greater rights to children proceed from 
93. See The Rights of Children-A Statement by Senator Walter F. Mondale, 43 
HARV. EDUC. REV. 483 (1973); Polier, Myths and Realities in the Search for Juvenile 
Justice, 44 HARV. EDUC. REV. 112, 121 (1974) ("the denial of services to children from 
minority groups [has] shadowed every aspect of child care and juvenile justice"). See 
generally CHILDREN A D POVERTY (N. GLAZER & C. Creedon eds. 1968). 
94. R. FAHSON, BIRTHRIGHTS 2 (1974). 
95. Foster & Freed, supra note 6, at 343. 
96. Wald, Making Sense Out of the Rights of Youth, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS 13, 15 (1974). 
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general premises of philosophical egalitarianism rather than from 
evidence that children as a class are damaged in some demonstra- 
ble way by existing constraints upon their liberty or that removal 
of such constraints would benefit them in some way. A sociologist 
who advocates full abolition of legal and social concepts of minor- 
ity status from compulsory education laws to laws restricting sex- 
ual activity, voting, marrying, divorcing, and contracting has 
stated: 
In another sense, asking what is good for children is beside 
the point. We will grant children rights for the same reason we 
grant rights to adults, not because we are sure that children will 
then become better people, but more for ideological reasons, 
because we believe that expanding freedom as a way of life is 
worthwhile in itself.97 
. . . .  
If all this sounds too open and free, we must recognize that 
in this society . . . we are not likely to err in the direction of too 
much freedom.98 
2. Supreme Court decisions 
Within the last decade, the Supreme Court has begun to 
address children's rights in constitutional terms. There does not 
97. FARSON, supra note 94, a t  31. 
98. Id. a t  31, 153. The a priori justification advanced by Farson for his point of view 
is shared by other children's liberation advocates who are unable to offer much support 
for their "radical version of children's right~'~-''[Ilts most convincing justification is 
simply that it is right." Wald, supra note 96, a t  29. Farson's views have received wide and 
provocative press coverage. Note, for example, the leading article by Joan Nassivera, Get 
Ready for Kids' Lib, National Observer, Sept. 14, 1974, a t  1, col. 1. Also, see Farson's 
treatment of the same topic in the L.A. Times, Oct. 19, 1975, part IV, a t  5, col. 2. 
A point of view similar to Farson's is outlined in educator John Holt's ESCAPE FROM 
CHILDHOOD (1974), which outlines and then treats a t  length a proposed list of rights that, 
it is argued, should be made available "to any young person, of whatever age, who wants 
to make use of them." Id. a t  18. The list includes the right to vote, the right to financial 
independence and responsibility, the right to choose where one lives, how one is 
educated-"the right to do, in general, . what any adult may legally do." Id. at  19. See also 
CHILDREN'S LIBERATION (D. ~ o t t l i e b  ed. 1973); CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (1971); M. GERZON, A 
CHILDHOOD FOR EVERY CHILD: THE POLITICS OF PARENTHOOD (1973). 
Such sources contain criticisms of the public school systems, assumptions about 
family life, and the effect of modern technological society upon children, with occasional 
reference to some legal issues. The prevailing tone of this literature is that of disappoint- 
ment and frustration with American institutions. Consider, for example, the statement 
by child psychiatrist Paul Adams that "the family's vital role in authoritarianism is 
entirely repugnant to the free soul in our age." Adams, The Infant, the Family and 
Society, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 51, 52 (1971). Adams asks for a restructuring of society in 
favor of children, but states that the conditions necessary to achieve the goals to which 
children are entitled are "to end war as an institution; then to eliminate poverty; then 
racism; and finally to put an end to the meaninglessness of living in a bureaucratized 
society ." Id. a t  76. 
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seem to be any necessary relationship between these cases and 
the country's heightened equality consciousness, a t  least not in 
the language of the decisions, but the coincidence in timing sug- 
gests that  the two developments are not unrelated. Still, the 
Court's concerns have been confined to much narrower contexts 
than the large-scale legal and social changes advocated by those 
who would reject the concept of minority status. The possibility 
that the Court's decisions may improperly be cited as authority 
for implications well beyond the Court's intent is no small risk 
in the current climate. I t  is therefore important to read the cases 
closely in search of both legal effects and underlying intentions. 
What follows is a descriptive summary of relevant recent cases. 
Further classification and analysis of these cases is offered in a 
subsequent section.g9 
In re Gaultlo0 established the principle that minors may not 
be denied basic prodecural due process in juvenile court proceed- 
ings. Drawing upon prior cases in which "restricted aspects" of 
procedural due process protection for minors had been acknowl- 
edged, Justice Fortas wrote that whatever the precise impact of 
the prior cases, "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill 
of Rights is for adults alone."lOl 
Gault was an especially compelling case. A 15-year-old boy 
had been committed to a state industrial school for a period up 
to 6 years on charges arising out of a lewd phone call. The facts 
indicated flagrant abuse of the simplest procedural protections, 
from lack of notice about the nature of the charge to absence of 
the complaining witness from the hearing. The opinion expressly 
rejects the idea that a child's only right is to custody, not lib- 
erty,lo2 thereby expressing the clearest idea to emerge from 
Gault-that there is nothing about minority status that requires 
the courts to exclude ideas about due process protections from 
proceedings involving juveniles. What the case meant for the ju- 
venile court philosophy of protecting minors against the full- 
blown formality of criminal proceedings, however, was less than 
clear in 1967. 
The meaning and implications of Gault have been developed 
in subsequent cases, many of which are summarized in McKeiver 
v. Pennsylvania, '03 wherein the Court rejected a claimed right to 
99. Notes 130-45 and accompanying text infra. 
100. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
101. Id. at 13. 
102. See id. at 17. 
103. 403 US. 528 (1971). 
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trial by jury in the juvenile courts. In McKeiver, the Court ex- 
plained that its collective decisions on due process requirements 
for juveniles arose from a special need to remedy what had be- 
come an inadequate fact-finding process in delinquency proceed- 
ings, rather than from a rejection of the basic philosophy of the 
juvenile justice system. The Court stated that Gault and its 
progeny "do not spell the doom of the juvenile court system or 
. . . deprive it of its 'informality, flexibility, or speed.' "Io4 Fur- 
ther, the Court made it clear that it "has not yet said that all 
rights constitutionally assured to an adult accused of crime . . . 
are . . . available to the juvenile . . . ."lo5 Rather, said the 
Court, denial of the right to a jury trial in fact promotes a desira- 
ble preferential treatment of minors accused of crimes: 
The imposition of the jury trial on the juvenile court system 
would not strengthen greatly, if at  all, the factfinding function, 
and would, contrarily, provide an attrition of the juvenile court's 
assumed ability to function in a unique manner. It would not 
remedy the defects of the system. Meager as has been the 
hoped-for advance in the juvenile field, the alternative would be 
regressive, would lose what has been gained, and would tend 
once again to place the juvenile in the routine of the criminal 
104. Id. a t  534, quoting I n  re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366 (1970). 
105. Id. a t  533. 
106. Id. a t  547. The Court continued: 
We are reluctant to disallow the States to experiment further and to seek 
in new and different ways the elusive answers to the problems of the young, and 
we feel that we would be impeding that experimentation by imposing the jury 
trial. 
. . . .  
. . . Concern about the inapplicability of exclusionary and other rules of 
evidence, about the juvenile court judge's possible awareness of the juvenile's 
prior record and of the contents of the social file; about repeated appearances 
of the same familiar witnesses in the persons of juvenile and probation officers 
and social workers-all to the effect that this will create the likelihood of pre- 
judgment-chooses to ignore, it seems to us, every aspect of fairness, of concern, 
of sympathy, and of paternal attention that the juvenile court system contem- 
plates. 
Id. at  547, 550. 
The disappointments of the juvenile court movement are hardly unique. The same 
report on which the Supreme Court relied so heavily in summarizing some of its negative 
conclusions about the juvenile courts also stated that to  "say that juvenile courts have 
failed to achieve their goals is to say no more than what is true of criminal courts in the 
United States. But failure is most striking when hopes are highest." THE PRESIDENT'S 
COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVE- 
NILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 7 (1967), quoted i n  McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 
U.S. 528, 545 (1971). 
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In the juvenile justice context, then, the Court has evidently not 
rejected the validity of a legal minority status, although it is 
willing to provide constitutional protection against the abuse of 
that status. 
The public school setting is the second major area in which 
the Supreme Court has acknowledged minors' rights of constitu- 
tional dimensions. In Tinker v. Des Moines School District, ln7 the 
Court found that the First Amendment rights of three students 
had been violated when school authorities suspended them from 
school for wearing black armbands to protest the government's 
policy in Vietnam. Writing for the majority, Justice Fortas stated 
that, "[sltudents in school as well as out of school are 'persons' 
under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights 
which the State must respect . . . ."'08 The Court did not elabo- 
rate on the meaning of "fundamental rights," leaving the reader 
uncertain whether the Court had in mind the introduction of any 
new principles broader than necessary to achieve the result of the 
case. This lack of clarity prompted Justice Stewart's concurring 
opinion, in which he stated that he could not "share the Court's 
uncritical assumption that ,  school discipline aside, the First 
Amendment rights of children are co-extensive with those of 
adults." Continuing, he stated that: "Indeed, I had thought the 
Court decided otherwise just last Term in Ginsberg v. New 
York ."log 
Tinker, like Gault, demonstrates the Court's willingness to 
recognize constitutional protections for minors. It is far from 
107. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
108. Id. at  511. 
109. Id. at  515 (citation omitted). For a summary of Ginsberg see notes 48-50 and 
accompanying text supra. In an emotional dissent by Justice Black, whose record in 
support of First Amendment freedoms needs no explanation, great concern was expressed 
about the implications of the Tinker decision: 
[IJf the time has come when pupils of state-supported schools, kindergartens, 
grammar schools, or high schools, can defy and flout orders of school officials 
to keep their minds on their own schoolwork, i t  is the beginning of a new revolu- 
tionary era of permissiveness in this country fostered by the judiciary. The next 
logical step, it appears to me, would be to hold unconstitutional laws that bar 
pupils under 21 or 18 from voting, or from being elected members of the boards 
of education. 
. . . .  
. . . The original idea of schools, which I do not believe is yet abandoned 
as worthless or out of date, was that children had not yet reached the point of 
experience and wisdom which enabled them to teach all of their elders. 
Id. at  518, 522. As pointed out more recently by Justice Powell in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U S .  
565, 600 n.22 (dissenting opinion), some of Justice Black's fears have been realized since 
Tinker through a "flood of litigation" by children alleging violations of their constitutional 
rights by school officials. 
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clear, however, that the Tinker Court intended directly to address 
the question of minority status. 
One of the cases apparently spawned by Tinker reached the 
Supreme Court in Goss v.  Lopez,l10 a 1975 decision holding that 
students facing temporary disciplinary suspensions from a public 
school are entitled to such due process protections as prior notice 
and an opportunity for a hearing. The Goss majority opinion, 
written by Justice White, also said nothing about the larger ques- 
tion of minority status raised by the concurring opinion in Tinker; 
however, Justice Powell's dissent in Goss did briefly address the 
larger question: 
[Tlhe Court ignores the experience of mankind as well as the 
long history of our law, recognizing that there are differences 
which must be accommodated in determining the rights and 
duties of children as compared with those of adults. Examples 
of this distinction abound in our law: in contracts, in torts, in 
criminal law and procedure, in criminal sanctions and rehabili- 
tation, and in the right to vote and to hold office. Until today, 
and except in the special context of the First Amendment issue 
in Tinker, the educational rights of children and teenagers in the 
elementary and secondary schools have not been analogized to 
the rights of adults or to those accorded college students. Even 
with respect to the First Amendment, the rights of children have 
not been regarded as "co-extensive with those of adults."ll1 
Justice Powell's statement accurately summarizes statutory and 
common law attitudes as well as the prior opinions of the Court, 
all of which have consistently recognized differences between 
adults and children-both by express acknowledgment and by 
assumptions of the obvious. 
Because the Goss majority did not explicitly deal with the 
historic distinction between the legal statuses of adults and mi- 
nors, it is doubtful that the Court intended to address that ques- 
tion by mere implication. It is more reasonable to expect that 
issues of that significance would be dealt with explicitly if the 
Court intended to deal with them at  all. Perhaps the most that 
is intended by Goss is found in Justice Powell's suggestion that 
minors' rights in the school context have now been "analogized" 
to the rights of adults. 
The Court has not yet addressed the issue of minor's consti- 
tutional rights in a case where a minor's claim was pitted against 
110. 419 U S .  565 (1975). 
111. Id. at  590-91 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
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the alleged constitutional rights of parents. In rejecting Justice 
Douglas' dissenting argument that the desires of the Amish chil- 
dren were relevant to the resolution of the case, the majority in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder112 did come close to dealing with that kind of 
conflict: 
Our holding in no way determines the proper resolution of 
possible competing interests of parents, children, and the State 
in an appropriate state court proceeding in which the power of 
the State is asserted on the theory that Amish parents are pre- 
venting their minor children from attending high school despite 
their expressed desires to the contrary. Recognition of the claim 
of the State in such a proceeding would, of course, call into 
question traditional concepts of parental control over the reli- 
gious upbringing and education of their minor children recog- 
nized in this Court's past decisions. It is clear that such an 
intrusion by a State into family decisions in the area of religious 
training would give rise to grave questions of religious freedom 
. . a .  
113 
This view reflects obvious concern with the family tradition 
and the implications for that tradition of a child's constitutional 
claim against the interests of his parents. Also, in such circum- 
stances it is the "claim of the State" that would create the con- 
flict, rather than the claim by a child. The assumption that the 
child's claim would be asserted by the state rather than by the 
child may arise out of the compulsory school law context of 
Yoder, but it may also reflect the implicit assumption that mi- 
nors would lack the capacity, legally, and perhaps practically, to 
assume responsibility for evaluating and asserting their own posi- 
tion. A further attempt to classify and evaluate the Court's chil- 
dren's rights decisions is made below.l14 
3. Lower court interpretations of Supreme Court decisions 
The failure of some key Supreme Court majority opinions to 
respond to invitations for clarification made by concurring and 
dissenting opinions may have left the impression that perhaps the 
Court has intended to make the constitutional rights of minors 
coextensive with those of adults. At least, the scarcity of clear 
statements on the general validity of a legal minority status has 
allowed some lower courts to conclude that they may, consistent 
112. 406 U S .  205 (1972). 
113. Id. at 231. 
114. Notes 130-45 and accompanying text infra. 
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with Supreme Court precedent, severely limit the effect of that 
status, if not abandon it completely.115 State v. Koome, I% 1975 
Washington case, illustrates such an interpretation. The signifi- 
cance of the case arises not only from its language, but also from 
the possible effect of its reasoning in a later Washington case, In 
re Snyder. 117 
Koome involved an appeal by a physician who had been 
convicted of violating a state criminal statute by performing an 
abortion on a woman under the age of 18 without the consent of 
her legal guardian. In holding that the statute unduly infringed 
on minors' constitutional right of privacy, the Supreme Court of 
Washington reasoned that: (1) Roe v. Wadells established that 
state regulation of abortions in the early stages of pregnancy vio- 
lates a pregnant woman's fundamental constitutional right of 
privacy; (2) minors are people and, therefore, have a fundamental 
constitutional right to privacy; and (3) statutory parental consent 
requirements constitute state interference with personal privacy 
to an extent not justified by any compelling state interest. Some 
equal protection arguments were also dealt with regarding the 
failure of any asserted state interest to justify age classifications 
affecting the fundamental right of privacy. Four of the nine 
judges in Koome dissented on the grounds that, even assuming 
the existence of a fundamental right of privacy for minors, the 
state had a sufficiently compelling interest in the "quality" of a 
minor's abortion decision and in the mental health of minors to 
justify the consent requirement.l19 
A major difference between the reasoning of the majority and 
dissenting opinions is the extent to which each recognized the 
legal status historically given to minors. The dissent defended the 
distinction between minors and other persons with broad, general 
arguments, citing authorities ranging from Supreme Court cases 
acknowledging the legitimacy of the classifications to the intro- 
ductory section of American Jurisprudence 2d's treatment of 
"infants." The majority view deeply undercut the distinction: 
115. See Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1975). 
116. 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975). 
117. 85 Wash. 2d 182, 532 P.2d 278 (1975). 
118. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
119. The dissenting opinion was influenced by the statute's requirement of consent 
by a "legal guardian" rather than by the minor's "parent," because the "guardian" 
language would permit a juvenile-court to intervene in the parent-child relationship under 
its neglect statute and appoint a guardian who could consent to an abortion in circum- 
stances where parental refusal amounted to neglect. 84 Wash. 2d at 921, 530 P.2d at 272. 
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Prima facie, the constitutional rights of minors, including 
the right of privacy, are coextensive with those of adults. Where 
minors' rights have been held subject to curtailment by the state 
in excess of that permissible in the case of adults it has been 
because some peculiar state interest existed in the regulation 
and protection of children, not because the rights themselves are 
of some inferior kind. 120 
The majority's choice of language betrays the contradiction 
inherent in its reasoning. By acknowledging that a "peculiar state 
interest" in "the regulation and protection of children" has justi- 
fied differential treatment, the court disproves its premise that 
"prima facie, the constitutional rights of minors . . . are coexten- 
sive with those of adults." The pattern has not been to presume 
"coextensive rights" or coextensive capacities; rather, the law has 
presumed the existence of basic differences between the capaci- 
ties and needs of children and adults. 
Because of this presumption, the basic inquiry in contexts 
involving minors has been the extent to which their peculiar limi- 
tations and needs justify or require greater flexibility, supervi- 
sion, protection, and the like. In addition, the law has consciously 
considered relevant parental claims in order to foster the long- 
range preference of our system for the family. 
Consider, for example, the common law's concern about the 
need for parental consent prior to the performance of surgery on 
a minor. The cases have long recognized that a child has a "right" 
to essential medical treatment. But the legal authority recognized 
in parents has always been carefully balanced against that right. 
In contrast, after suddenly concluding that a "constitutional 
right" may be involved in the abortion context, the Washington 
court only casually and inaccurately addresses the common law 
background. The court relies more heavily on two recent Wash- 
ington statutes that authorize minors 14 years of age and older 
to receive treatment for drug abuse and venereal disease without 
parental consent.121 Although the court does not discuss the poli- 
cies represented by these statutes, they appear to involve two 
special situations that have been singled out for legislative treat- 
ment because of the unusually strong and recent interest in as- 
sisting youth afflicted by drug addiction and venereal disease to 
obtain confidential nonsurgical treatment for problems that pose 
serious permanent threats to their physical health. 
120. Id. at 904, 530 P.2d at 263. 
121. Id. at 910-11, 530 P.2d at 266-67. 
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The court then cites and quotes a t  length from a 1967 Wash- 
ington case which held that a jury could appropriately evaluate 
the capacity of a married, 18-year-old father to give an informed 
consent to sterilization surgery. Further, the court refers to Wash- 
ington's basic age-of-majority statute, which authorizes persons 
18 years of age and older to marry, consent to surgery, and other- 
wise act as adults. These latter two references are irrelevant to 
the common law positions of minors because they deal with 
adults, not with unemancipated minors. 
The court's only other statement about parental consent re- 
quirements is a surprising misstatement of authority: 
A doctor competently performing any other type of surgery 
[than abortion] on a consenting minor runs virtually no risk of 
even civil liability because of the absence of parental consent. 
See Pilpel, Minor's Rights to Medical Care, 36 Albany L. Rev. 
462, 466 (1972) .Iz2 
Many cases have established the prevailing common law rule that 
liability may be imposed upon a physician in such circumstances, 
and Ms. Pilpel does not dispute the existence of the cases or the 
rule. Rather, she simply observes that "no case has been found 
in any jurisdiction in which liability has been imposed on a physi- 
cian or health facility on the basis of failure to secure parental 
consent for any kind of medical treatment where the minor was 
over the age of 15 years." She points out that despite this fact, 
doctors remain fearful of treating minors without parental con- 
sent, and therefore she favors the adoption of statutes altering 
current consent requirements. With this as its sole authority, the 
Koome court concludes that a statute requiring parental consent 
for abortions is inconsistent with the common law. Existing case 
law, even in Washington, seems to be quite the opposite.I2" 
This brief treatment of the Washington court's lapse of both 
perception and judgment is not presented merely to criticize its 
statement of the law, but, more importantly, to illustrate the 
extent to which the apparent magic of a child's alleged constitu- 
tional right can desensitize a generally competent court to the 
real context in which a parent-child conflict arises. Any adequate 
discussion of the constitutionality of statutes requiring parental 
consent for abortions must take into account the origins and pur- 
poses of the common law rules on parental consent to surgery on 
122. Id. a t  913, 530 P.2d at 268. 
123. E.g., In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942). See also In re Green, 
448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18 (4th ed. 1971). 
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children, just as the United States Supreme Court has taken into 
account the context of the juvenile court in its juvenile due pro- 
cess decisions and the public school context in the school disci- 
pline decisions. The involvement of a constitutional right for mi- 
nors by no means lifts a case above the practical and policy prob- 
lems of minority status into some abstract sphere in which an 
abandonment of that special body of law that has always applied 
to children is justified. When both parents and children are in- 
volved, as in Koome, the law must concern itself even more with 
that special context, since a court must then confront the unique 
legal and social role of parents. 
It is doubtful whether the children's rights decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court warrant the conclusion that, by 
interjecting concerns of constitutional dimension into state pro- 
cesses involving minors, the Court has intended to say that the 
presumptions justifying the treatment of minors as a special class 
have become outmoded. None of the relevant cases imply that the 
actual capacities of minors have changed in any way that requires 
a change in the legal rules or assumptions that grew out of the 
traditional view that the competence of minors to exercise adult 
rights is limited. The oversimplified reasoning of courts that be- 
lieve recent constitutional case law has made the "rights" of mi- 
nors "prima facie . . . co-extensive with those of adults" is espe- 
cially dangerous, since such reasoning permits a shift in the cru- 
cial presumptions about the status or capacity of minors. Indeed, 
just such a shift seems to occur in State v. Koome because of the 
heavy presumptive effect of placing the claim of a minor behind 
the barricades of the compelling state interest test. 
This shift in presumptions in the laws dealing with minors 
can come legitimately only after a strong factual showing that  
there is no longer any basis for the premises underlying tradi- 
tional treatment of minors. That there has been such a showing 
regarding the factual premises underlying certain limited aspects 
of the procedures employed by the juvenile courts or the public 
schools may illustrate the process by which specific, case-by-case 
changes in the law's treatment of minors will and should come 
about; but the showing in those narrow areas dealt primarily with 
certain procedural issues, not the general question of the capacity 
of minors. These cases offer no rational justification for abandon- 
ing an established, factually based presumption, the disappear- 
ance of which would have almost limitless consequences for 
American law. 
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The use of "children's rights" terminology in Koome not only 
teased the court away from dealing adequately with established 
presumptions about minority capacity, but it also precluded any 
serious attempt at  dealing with established presumptions about 
parental roles and rights. The purpose and history of either pre- 
sumption is sufficient to place the problem of minors' abortions 
on a different plane from the matter of adult abortions. Taken 
together, the two presumptions demand a broad and sophisti- 
cated judicial inquiry into both evidence and policy. No such 
inquiry was supplied by the Washington court, perhaps because 
it believed that the introduction of terms used in the individual 
tradition somehow made the family tradition irrelevant. 
In Poe v. Gerstein, 124 another case dealing with parental con- 
sent requirements for abortions performed on minors, the Fifth 
Circuit showed a similar tendency to place what is characterized 
as a child's constitutional right ahead of parental and familial 
interests. One wonders what the logical extensions of the follow- 
ing reasoning might mean for the myriad other sources of normal 
parent -child confrontation: 
[Mlerely facing one's parents with the problems of unwanted 
pregnancy would present a considerable deterrent to abortion 
among teenage girls and, in fact, may adversely affect their 
mental and physical health and thereby arguably infringe upon 
the minor's constitutional rights.125 
This point of view carries overtones of an important theme in the 
egalitarian ethic as it applies to the parental role: "[Tlhe fam- 
ily's vital role in authoritarianism is entirely repugnant to the free 
soul in our age."126 
The Washington court's opinion in the Snyder case, dis- 
cussed as the introductory illustration of this article, was handed 
down just 1 month after that court's decision in Koome. Although 
the court in Snyder avoided reference to a children's rights theory 
in upholding the juvenile court's finding of incorrigibility, the 
record and the briefs filed in the case make i t  clear that the 
parties favoring the lower court action were influenced by a broad 
reading of Gault and general literature arguing for a broad exten- 
sion of the traditional rights of minors.12' The "right" of a child 
to effect termination of parent,al custody as a means of perma- 
124. 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975). 
125. Id. a t  793 n.11. 
126. Adams, The Infant, the Family and Society, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 51,52 (1971). 
127. See notes 4-7 and accompanying text supra. 
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nently leaving home when there is a "serious family conflict" has 
been advocated in various ways in recent 1i terat~re . l~~ However, 
Snyder may be the first case in which legal proceedings have 
resulted in a child-initiated termination of parental rights in the 
express absence of any finding of parental unfitness. 
Although the Snyder court may not have believed it was 
breaking new ground, its uncritical acceptance of what amounts 
to a children's rights position on a matter as basic as parental 
custody is worthy of some attention. Under both the theory and 
the result of Snyder, there is little to prevent any other dissatis- 
fied and "resolute" child from taking the same position and 
achieving the same outcome as the teenager in that case.12) It is 
a t  least reasonable to wonder to what extent the philosophy of 
constitutional rights for minors made explicit in Koome may have 
influenced the court's assessment of the issues in Snyder. 
Perhaps the courts involved in Gerstein, Koome, and Snyder 
were unwittingly influenced by the modern winds of 
egalitarianism; perhaps they were conscientiously trying to follow 
the leadership of the Supreme Court; perhaps the impact those 
decisions would have on the family tradition was not adequately 
pointed out by counsel; perhaps that impact was pointed out, 
understood, and rejected. Whatever their basis, cases like these 
convey the impression that, in the aftermath of Gault, the nation 
has suddenly awakened to the supposedly startling idea that chil- 
dren are people. 
With that awakening comes embarrassment and an impulse 
to right all the wrongs ever committed against children. The vehi- 
- - 
128. J. HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD 206 (1974) (establishment of "secondary guard- 
ians" to which children could turn if they desire to leave their natural parents); FARSON, 
supra note 94, at 42-62 (1974) (Kibbutz-type cooperative arrangements to take children 
away from possible conflicts a t  home); Foster & Freed, supra note 6, a t  368 (1972) (ap- 
pointment of a public guardian to serve the best interests of children). 
129. The following excerpts characterize the view taken by the state of the child's 
position in Snyder: 
[Clo-respondent is a bright, able and resolute young woman who . . . know- 
ingly and intelligently admitted the facts of the petition. 
. . . .  
. . . The petitioner's contention seems to be that . . . only in cases of 
extreme physical abuse or neglect should the state be allowed to intervene. 
Cynthia Snyder is a person who has apparently made a decision about her life. 
That decision is that she will not go home and be treated like an inanimate 
possession by her parents. 
. . . .  
. . . [Clhildren are autonomous individuals, entitled to the same rights 
and privileges before the law as adults. 
Brief of State Respondent at  5, 11, 23. 
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cle for this penance is a series of judicial pronouncements that 
seem to incorporate by reference and thereby misapply massive 
amounts of constitutional law and other legal doctrines developed 
painstakingly over the generations in cases involving adult liti- 
gants and the classes they represent. These pronouncements also 
tend to ignore another large group of legal concepts already devel- 
oped to meet the special needs and problems of children in fami- 
lies. 
A. Rights of Protection us. Rights of Choice 
When children are involved, a significant distinction can be 
drawn between legal rights that protect one from undue interfer- 
ence by the state or from the harmful acts of others and legal 
rights that permit persons to make affirmative choices of binding 
consequence, such as voting, marrying, exercising religious pref- 
erences, and choosing whether to seek e d u ~ a t i 0 n . l ~ ~  For purposes 
of this discussion, the first category will be referred to as rights 
of protection; the second, rights of choice. 
Rights of protection include the right not to be imprisoned 
without due process, rights to propertb and rights to physical 
protection. The protection category seems to embrace most, if not 
all, of the legal doctrines that have been developed to date for the 
benefit of minors in both the constitutional context and the juve- 
nile law context. Gault, for example, was expressly concerned 
only with procedural protections applicable to the adjudicatory 
130. A general distinction of this type has been suggested in Kleinfeld, The Balance 
of Power Among Infants, Their Parents, and The State, 4 FAMILY L.Q. 320, 321-22 (1970). 
The Supreme Court has construed the "liberty" rights of the due process clause 
broadly and has in recent years rejected the distinction between "rights" and "privileges" 
which was once thought applicable to procedural due process rights. Board of Regents v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972). The liberty concept has been defined to include "not 
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, . . . 
to marry, . . . [and] to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience 
. . . ." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). The elimination of the rights- 
privileges distinction and the use of such expansive language may appear to suggest that 
there is no room for a distinction between protection rights and choice rights. However, 
the rights-privileges distinction focuses on the form of liberty in question, while the 
protection-choice distinction argued for here focuses on the individual's capacity to bene- 
fit from the liberty in question. Moreover, the flexibility inherent in the broad approach 
to due process liberty actually encourages giving attention to factual distinctions as mean- 
ingful as capacity, so that instead of being bound by purely monolithic theories about 
"rights," the courts may evaluate "the significance of the state-created or state-enforced 
right and . . . the substantiality of the alleged deprivation." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. a t  
599-600 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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stage of juvenile delinquency proceedings in which incarceration 
may be a consequence of the adjudication.13' McKeiver noted that  
all of the Court's juvenile delinquency decisions had been limited 
to the application of certain procedural constitutional protections 
to the adjudicative aspects of juvenile proceedings.'" Neverthe- 
less, the McKeiver Court refused to grant the right to trial by jury 
to juveniles precisely because that particular right did not pro- 
vide a form of protection beneficial to minors, given the Court's 
continuing commitment to the "paternal attention that the juve- 
nile court system  contemplate^."'^^ 
Goss v. Lopez proceeds from the due process principle of 
protection against the procedurally unfair deprivation of a state- 
created right to education. The Goss Court identified this right 
as "a property interest . . . which may not be taken away for 
misconduct without adherence to the minimum procedures re- 
quired by the [due process] clause."134 The due process guaran- 
tees applied in Goss were also intended to protect students 
against the arbitrary deprivations of liberty thought to be inher- 
ent in the damage to their personal reputations caused by suspen- 
sion. 
Tinker is less clearly in the protection category than are the 
due process cases. The First Amendment rights involved in that  
case are probably closer, as a matter of pure theoretical catego- 
ries, to choice rights than protection rights. I t  was this theoretical 
aspect of Tinker that caused Justice Stewart to enter a concurring 
opinion in which he wrote that "[a] State may permissibly de- 
termine that,  a t  least in some precisely delineated areas, a 
child-like someone in a captive audience-is not possessed of 
that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposi- 
tion of First Amendment  guarantee^."'^^ Justice Stewart's reason- 
ing suggests that it is reasonable to conclude (as he did) that the 
school authorities in Tinker could be legally limited in restricting 
the right of students peacefully to wear black armbands without 
also concluding that such an outcome imputes "full capacity for 
individual choice" to public school students. This position flows 
in part from the observation that  the exercise of free speech rights 
131. 387 U.S. a t  13. 
132. 403 U.S. a t  550. 
133. Id. 
134. 419 U.S. a t  574. 
135. 393 U.S. a t  515 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring), quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 
390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968). Justice Powell, who dissented in Goss, would also have joined 
in the Tinker conclusion, had he been on the Court, because it was "a narrowly written 
First Amendment opinion which I could well have joined on its facts." 419 U.S. at  600 
n.22 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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in the Tinker context did not involve the assumption of binding 
and permanent responsibility that would be involved in such 
choice rights as voting, contracting, or marrying. It can also be 
argued that the rights of parents to free expression and control of 
their children may have been an important subject of protection 
in Tinker since the parents of the children involved had encour- 
aged their children to wear the armbands and were obviously 
instrumental in bringing the litigation that ensued.136 In that 
sense, Tinker might be considered another in the long line of cases 
protecting parental rights to teach and influence their children 
against state claims that would limit the exercise of such parental 
prerogatives. Thus, Tinker is not an obstacle to the assertion that 
none of the Supreme Court's children's rights cases provide au- 
thority for upholding the exercise of minors' choice rights- 
particularly against contrary parental claims. 
The statutes creating juvenile court jurisdiction over parents 
are also in the "protection" category, being designed to protect 
children against harmful abuse, neglect, or abandonment by their 
parents. Moreover, the entire juvenile justice system is based 
upon the premise that children who are yet in the developmental 
stages of becoming mature adults should be protected against the 
long term implications of their own decisions made a t  a time 
when they lack sufficient capacity and experience to be held as 
responsible as an adult would be for the same decision. Thus, 
legal limitations on the effect of minors' choices are in fact 
"rights" designed for minors' protection. That basic philosophy 
has not been repudiated by the Court's recent juvenile due pro- 
cess cases, which have criticized specific inadequacies of modern 
juvenile court factfinding procedures, but not the concepts about 
the peculiar capacities and needs of children that underlie the 
juvenile court system.13? 
More broadly, it has been of profound importance in all legal 
inquiries involving children that  minors are presumed by all 
phases of the law (and by the culture reflected by our law) not to 
- 
136. See Burt, supra note 39, a t  122-23. 
137. In addition to the language from Gault and McKeiuer quoted in the text accom- 
panying notes 100-106 supra, consider this language from Justice White's concurring 
opinion in McKeiuer: 
Reprehensible acts by juveniles are not deemed the consequence of mature . . . 
choice but of environmental pressures (or lack of them) or of other forces beyond 
their control. Hence the state legislative judgment not to stigmatize the juvenile 
delinquent by branding him a criminal; his conduct is not deemed so blamewor- 
thy that punishment is required to deter him or others. 
403 U.S. a t  551-52 (White, J., concurring). 
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have the same basic capacities as adults. That presumption is so 
obvious that it has not been the subject of any discussion in the 
Supreme Court cases on the constitutional rights of children. Of 
course, nothing about the capacity presumption precludes the 
Court from considering whether, either in spite of the presump- 
tion or because of it, certain circumstances warrant a definition 
of the precise ways in which the legal position of a minor in a 
given situation should be protected, for constitutional or other 
reasons. Indeed, the presumption that minors lack adult capacity 
has remained preeminent in cases involving juveniles, to the ex- 
tent that the Court has specifically refused to consider the "total- 
ity of the relationship of the minor and the State."13R ather, the 
Court has preferred to leave intact the basic presumption of the 
legal incapacity of minors, making specific, narrow adjustments 
on a case-by-case basis. 
The presumptions arising from the limited capacities of mi- 
nors account in large part for the general limitation on their exer- 
cise of rights that are in the "choice" category, because the law 
assumes, as suggested by Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in 
Tinker, that a basic capacity to make responsible choices is a 
prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of choice rights. For exam- 
ple, the age limitation on voting rights has been thought to fix the 
level above which citizens "are capable of intelligent and respon- 
sible exercise of the right to vote."13g This restriction has persisted 
even though the right to vote may be the most fundamental of 
citizenship rights because it is "preservative of other basic civil 
and political rights."140 Presumably, also for general reasons of 
capacity, the Constitution expressly limits membership in the 
House of Representatives and the Senate on the basis of age, and 
lists age as a qualification for the Presidency.141 Other illustra- 
tions abound, from statutes fixing the age below which one may 
not marry without parental consent to longstanding common law 
and statutory rules presuming lack of capacity to make a legal 
contract or to consent to sexual or tortious acts.142 
The serious question about the capacity limitation is where 
to draw the age line above which a given right or activity may be 
138. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968). 
139. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U S .  112, 240 (1970) (Brennan, White & Marshall, JJ., 
concurring). 
140. Reynolds v. Sims. 377 U S .  533, 562 (1964). 
141. U.S. CONST. art. I, $ $  2, 3; art. 11, $ 1. 
142. For a discussion of limitations on the right to vote in the context of other legal 
restrictions based upon age see Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their 
Parents and The State, 5 FAMILY L.Q. 64 (1971). 
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permitted. Children develop from incapacity toward capacity. 
That incontrovertible natural pattern is consistent with the pre- 
sumption that capacity does not exist for children as a class until 
the general weight of evidence shows that a given level of capacity 
does in fact exist.143 To presume, to the contrary, that rational 
and judgmental capacities exist until the evidence demonstrates 
otherwise is to defy both logic and experience, because the evi- 
dence already demonstrates from the outset that such capacities 
among infants are negligible. Thus, the presumption of incapac- 
ity to make certain choices is compelled by nature. 
The effect of the protection-choice distinction may be illus- 
trated by reference to two specific situations. The first is where a 
minor desires state support of a decision to have an abortion. If 
the physical health of a pregnant minor were in danger in a given 
case, existing rights to physical protection would prevent parents 
from legally resisting the abortion. Otherwise, however, no right 
to protection from serious harm is involved, leaving the right to 
make the decision in the choice category. The long-range psychol- 
ogical implications of the decision present the young woman with 
formidable difficulties in trying to make a mature assessment of 
her ability to live with the consequences of either an affirmative 
or a negative abortion decision. There is no reason to assume that 
she would have greater capacity to evaluate the implications of 
an abortion than she would the consequences of voting or marry- 
ing. It can be argued, of course, that certain parents may be in 
no better position to evaluate those risks than are their chil- 
dren-and may be even less likely to provide a better evaluation 
than a physician or a trained social worker. Whether the adult 
advice received by a pregnant minor comes from a parent or a 
professional, however, raises larger questions than who knows 
more about abortions, since once children are allowed to decide 
whose advice about abortions they will accept, there is little rea- 
son not to extend the right to parental noninterference to many 
other subjects, ranging from a minor's lifestyle choices to adoles- 
cent marriage. Thus, to bar a parent's right to prevent a minor 
child from having an abortion when no serious danger to health 
exists is to provide precedent for abrogating traditional parental 
control over the entire range of minors' choice rights. 
In spite of some lower court decisions that statutes requiring 
parental consent for minors' abortions are uncon~t i tu t iona l ,~~~  it 
- 
143. See p. 605 supra. 
144. E.g., Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975); Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 
847 (D. Mass. 1975); State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901,530 P.2d 260 (1975). See also Note, 
The Minor's Right to Abortion and the Requirement of Parental Consent, 60 V A .  L. REV. 
305 (1974). 
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is not clear that any general judicial change has been intended 
in the common law's historic recognition of parental control over 
children's decisions to submit to surgery, especially when such 
surgery is not medically necessary to their physical health. If that  
rule is to be overturned in the abortion context simply because 
the right to have an abortion has been said to be "fundamental" 
for adult women, a court would have difficulty refusing a minor 
the affirmative right to make choices that control more about her 
life than her body. 
The Snyder case illustrates the second situation, where a 
child desires a familial separation against the wishes of legally fit 
parents on grounds tantamount to incompatibility. In such a 
case, there is no parental abuse, neglect, or abandonment in- 
volved, so the child's rights to protection are not a t  stake. This 
is, therefore, a relatively extreme minor's choice matter. Ac- 
knowledgement of a child's right successfully to make such a 
choice necessarily assumes mutuality of capacity between par- 
ents and children, both in the formal legal sense and in the sub- 
stantive sense of individual capacity to assume total responsibil- 
ity for one's decisions. To conclude that children have the capac- 
ity to participate in or initiate a legal severance of family ties 
requires that the present legal presumption about the incapacity 
of minors be reversed. This reversal requires not only a flick of 
the legal wrist, but also a clear evidentiary demonstration that  
children as a class are not characterized by actual limitations 
upon their capacity to form judgments, assume economic respon- 
sibility, and otherwise act independently in their own behalf. 
In the absence of such a reversal, a child would require repre- 
sentation in such a proceeding by some adult who could assert the 
best interests of the child, even though some such assertions may 
differ from the child's preferences. But when the parents are le- 
gally fit, who is to say that a nonparental guardian or a juvenile 
court judge is better able to interpret the child's interests than 
are the child's parents? It is precisely that question that has made 
most students of the subject argue strongly in favor of retaining 
support for the protection of natural family ties, because experi- 
ence has shown that to do so is a better alternative for the chil- 
dren involved,'45 even though the children themselves are not yet 
in a position to appreciate fully why that may be so. 
145. See, e.g., Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search 
for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1975). 
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The term "choice rights" as it has been used here applies to 
minors' decisions having serious long term consequences that 
have traditionally required either legal or parental approval (or 
both) in order to be enforceable. To suggest that legal rights of 
this special character should not be given premature approval is, 
however, not to argue for increased state-supported parental in- 
terference with the vast variety of less solemn choices that arise 
daily in the lives of children. Indeed, the availability of gradually 
increasing freedom to live with the consequences of one's own 
decisions is a critical element in the development of mature judg- 
mental capacities. Still, the development of the capacity for re- 
sponsible choice selection is an educational process in which 
growth can be smothered and stunted if unlimited freedom and 
unlimited responsibility are thrust too soon upon the young. 
Moreover, the lifelong effects of binding, childish choices can 
create permanent deprivations far more detrimental than the 
temporary limitations upon freedom inherent in the discipline of 
educational processes. 
The development of the capacity to function as a mature, 
independent member of society is essential to the meaningful 
exercise of the full range of choice rights characteristic of the 
individual tradition. Precisely because of their lack of capacity, 
minors should enjoy legally protected rights to special treatment 
(including some protection against their own immaturity) that 
will optimize their opportunities for the development of mature 
capabilities that are in their best interest. Children will outgrow 
their restricted state, but the more important question is whether 
they will outgrow it with maximized capacities. An assumption 
that rational and moral capacity exists, when in fact i t  does not 
exist, may lead to an abandonment of the protections, processes, 
and opportunities that can develop these very capacities. In this 
sense, the concept of restricting certain choice rights is in fact an 
important form of protection rights. For these reasons, some dis- 
tinction between rights of protection and rights of choice must be 
preserved. As suggested above, the existing children's rights deci- 
sions of the Supreme Court could reasonably be categorized as 
cases involving rights of protection only. I t  would be both inap- 
propriate and contrary to the ultimate interests of children to 
construe those decisions as encouraging the removal of traditional 
constraints upon minors' exercise of choice rights. 
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B. The  Right of a Child Not  To  Be Abandoned to His "Rights": 
The  Most Basic Right? 
The influences of some parental authority and responsibility 
are inevitable in view of the natural dependence of children. 
Rather than inhibiting optimal child development, however, this 
element of the parent-child relationship may be the child's most 
valuable source of developmental sustenance. Psychological evi- 
dence indicates that children "are not adults in miniature, they 
are being per se, different from their elders in their mental nature, 
their functioning, their understanding of events, and their reac- 
tions to them."146 Children have many special needs that must be 
met in their quest for maturity and independence. The most criti- 
cal of these needs is a satisfactory and permanent psychological 
relationship with their parents. Thus, even assuming the highest 
policy priority for fulfilling the actual needs of children, the worst 
possible results would be visited upon children by "liberating" 
them from the crucial psychological matrix of true family 
relationships. That kind of liberation would constitute the most 
ironic adult treatment of children-"abandoning them to their 
'rights.' "I4' AS stated by Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit: 
Psychoanalytic theory . . . [and] developmental studies 
by students of other orientations [establish] the need of every 
child for unbroken continuity of affection and stimulating rela- 
tionships with an adult. 
. . . .  
To safeguard the right of parents to raise their children as 
they see fit, free of government intrusion, except in cases of 
neglect and abandonment, is to safeguard each child's need for 
continuity. This preference for minimum state intervention 
and for leaving well enough alone is reinforced by our recogni- 
tion that law is incapable of effectively managing, except in a 
very gross sense, so delicate and complex a relationship as that 
between parent and child.14$ 
This thesis suggests t h a t  parental authority must be re- 
garded as a sovereign right if the psychological needs of children 
are in fact to be met. If there is insecurity or lack of commitment 
in the relationship, either because of governmental intrusion or 
because a parent has substantial doubts about the extent of his 
146. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
13 (1973). 
147. PANEL DISCUSSION REMARKS OF ALBERT SOLNIT, CHILD ADVOCACY CONFERENCE, 
MADISON, WISCONSIN, SEFT. 26, 1975. 
148. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, supra note 146, at 6, 7-8. 
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or her personal authority, serious psychological deficiencies are 
more likely to exist in the relationship. For this reason, these 
authors resist the use of temporary foster parents in child- 
placement decisions, because foster parents "find themselves 
deprived of the position on which parental tolerance, endurance, 
and devotion are commonly based, namely that of being the un- 
disputed sole possessor of the child and the supreme arbiter of his 
fate." In that kind of relationship, insecurity and lack of emo- 
tional constancy "[defeat] the very intentions of the decision to 
move from professional institutional care to family care."14g 
This understanding of the needs of children enables a more 
long-range interpretation of what children may well "prefer" 
under the most theoretical views of egalitarian fairness. In A 
Theory of Justice, John Rawls would include children within the 
class of beings protected by his principles of justice, because chil- 
dren possess innate (although unrealized) moral capacity.15We 
maintains that guardians should be "guided by [the child's] own 
settled preferences and interests insofar as they are not irra- 
tional."151 He acknowledges, however, that children generally lack 
the rationality to act for themselves152 and therefore suggests that 
adults in a guardian role should try to obtain for a child "the 
things he presumably wants, whatever else he wants."lS Rawls 
has been interpreted to mean that no one (including parents) 
should be permitted to act on behalf of children until the absence 
of a child's "full ability to decide" for himself has been affirma- 
149. Id. a t  24-25. 
New York Family Court Judge Nanette Dembitz has expressed her concern that 
Beyond the Best Interests of  the Child focuses too exclusively on the interests of children 
while ignoring basic parental rights: "The doctrine of the biological parent's natural 
rights, which continues to appear in numerous New York decisions, reflects a deeply held 
ethic." Dembitz, Book Review, 83 YALE L.J. 1304, 1306 (1974). Judge Dembitz may be 
among others who have seen the Goldstein-Freud-Solnit work as advocating premature 
interference with biological parent-child relationships. However, close reading of the book 
as well as conversations with its authors confirms that the authors favor parental auton- 
omy as a general rule, as indicated in the text, except in cases of neglect, abandonment, 
or other recognized circumstances that give rise to custody disputes. They have not advo- 
cated new intervention standards, but merely new standards for evaluating custody dispo- 
sitions once existing standards have put custody into issue. 
150. J .  RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 509 (1971) states: 
[T]he minimal requirements defining moral personality [those entitled to 
equal justice under his theory] refer to a capacity and not to the realization of 
it. A being that has this capacity, whether or not it is yet developed, is to receive 
the full protection of the principles of justice. [This includes] . . . infants and 
children . . . ." 
151. Id. at  249. 
152. See id. at  209, 244. 
153. Id. a t  249. 
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tively demonstrated in a given situation1"-in other words, that 
the existing presumptions about minors' lack of capacity should 
be reversed. But Rawls has offered no new proof about the capaci- 
ties of children, nor does he purport to know what children "pre- 
sumably" want, especially when that presumed wanting is to be 
evaluated, under his theory, according to the view a child would 
have if he enjoyed adult capacity at  the time a decision affecting 
him is made. It is arguable under Rawls' theory, given the evi- 
dence showing the critical psychological value of secure, parent- 
directed family relationships, that the encouragement of parental 
authority is the most likely means of satisfying the long-range 
needs of children. When imagining themselves as children, per- 
sons who accept that evidence would "presumably" prefer subjec- 
tion to parental control up to the point of actual abuse or neglect, 
even if that meant their expressed preferences as children would 
frequently be overridden. 
There is a group of legal scholars in the family law field who 
recognize the need for family autonomy, but whose commitment 
to the individual tradition leaves them idealogically uncomforta- 
ble with the thought that state policies should encourage parental 
authority over children. Consider, for example, this statement 
from a student treatment of problems arising from statutory par- 
ental consent requirements as a condition to the availability of 
contraceptives to minors: 
Moreover, it is a misconception to equate the preservation 
of family structure with reinforcement of parental control. 
Maintaining the integrity of the family is not only a reflection 
of interests of the parents. It also mirrors a distinguishable, 
relational privacy interest, arguably rooted in first amendment 
associational values, the thrust of which is not merely to protect 
parental authority, but also to safeguard from state encroach- 
ment the intimacy and autonomy of the family relationship. 
Where, as in the contraceptive context, individual interests of 
parent and child are likely to collide, protection of their shared 
relational interest assumes independent importance and should 
not be directed at reinforcing the values of parents alone, which 
results when a parental consent requirement is imposed, but 
rather a t  fostering autonomous intrafamilial resolution of con- 
troversies. Iss 
This comment reflects the merit of encouraging the autono- 
iS4. Worsfold, A Philosophical Justification for Children's Rights, 44 HARV. EDUC. 
REV. 142, 156 (1974). 
155. Note, Parental Consent Requirements and Privacy Rights o f  Minors: The Con- 
traceptive Controversy, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1001, 1017-18 (1975). 
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mous resolution of family differences, but it necessarily assumes 
a degree of equality in capacities and roles within the family 
relationship that is neither realistic nor in the ultimate interests 
of children. The psychological value of autonomy in the family 
relationship cannot truly be accomplished if parental authority 
is not ultimately authoritative. While authority may be most 
effectively used when based upon patient persuasion rather than 
only upon brute force, the family that operates as a true democ- 
racy is less likely to provide the security, the role-modeling, the 
leadership, the socializing, the growth, or many of the other inter- 
ests preserved by a basic policy decision that parental authority 
is worthy of some state support. That has been the premise un- 
derlying much juvenile court law, and, in spite of the abuses that 
have been generated in extreme cases by inept caseworkers and 
insensitive parents, the concept retains a soundness that is still 
preferable to the anarchy that would result from state support of 
some kind of democratic egalitarianism among all family mem- 
bers. The failure of the state to provide some support for parental 
authority-even if as a last resort-is likely to diminish the power 
of parent-child relationships to provide the psychological matrix 
necessary to optimize the preparation of children for independent 
participation in adult society. 
It has nevertheless been argued15Vhat concerns about state 
intervention into family life should apply not only to direct acts 
by state agents, but also to the use of state resources as supports 
for parental authority. This view of opposition to state interven- 
tion seems to derive from a philosophical position that opposes 
not only governmental action but also any authoritarian interfer- 
ence with the lives of children. Ironically, limiting parental au- 
thority is likely to require some kind of state intervention on 
behalf of children, perhaps in the form of more far-reaching recog- 
nitions of children's rights in contexts where their actual needs 
for protection are not a t  stake. It is not possible for the state to 
remain truly neutral, particularly when parents begin with a 
position of authority over their children within the inherent sta- 
tus quo. Denying a portion of parental authority necessarily adds 
to the authority of children. Such an addition may be appropriate 
when the circumstances make it clear in an individual case that 
children have some special need. But, as long as the limited ca- 
pacities of children make i t  either impossible, unrealistic, or un- 
156. Burt, supra note 39, at 132. 
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fair to them to let them assume full responsibility for their own 
lives, ultimate control over their conduct must and will necessar- 
ily rest either with their parents or with the state. Thus, reducing 
parental authority simply creates increased state involvement. 
That, it is submitted, would be the worse of two potential evils. 
Professor Michael Wald has advanced a compelling series of 
arguments for a reduced level of state intervention in parent-child 
relationships. He maintains that a desirable diversity of views, 
lifestyles, and attitudes is encouraged by parental autonomy; 
that since our society is unsure of the best methods or even the 
objectives of child-rearing in any event, children should be pro- 
tected only from the more obvious harms upon which policymak- 
ers can agree; and that state intervention has a long record of 
placing children in more detrimental positions than they would 
have been without such intervention.15' These observations, par- 
ticularly the extensive documentation related to the frequent fail- 
ure of state intervention, suggest additional reasons why the 
maintenance of parental autonomy is, when compared to the al- 
ternatives, in the best interests of children. After an exhaustive 
analysis of a set of proposals designed to cope with presently 
inadequate standards, Professor Wald concludes: 
The approach suggested in this Article might be viewed by 
some readers as more solicitous of parents' rights than of chil- 
dren's rights. As such, it may be interpreted as a defense of the 
"old system" against the mounting calls for emphasis on chil- 
dren's rights and greater state protection for children; but, to 
me, such charges are unwarranted. Aiding children through 
coercive intervention has not proven to be a success.158 
Filtering through the lines in this statement is a certain reluct- 
ance to acknowledge explicitly the position that seems to have 
been advocated, and it needs no apology: preservation of the 
parental authority that is a prerequisite to meaningful family 
autonomy is in fact in the interest of children and their most vital 
long-range rights. 
To the extent that governmental policies foster noncommit- 
tal attitudes on the part of parents-either because parents be- 
lieve they have no right to give direction to their children, or 
because they fear that in giving them direction they might meet 
the kind of state-supported resistance encountered by the parents 
of Cynthia Snyder-both the children of those families and the 
larger society will suffer. 
157. Wald, supra note 145, at 992-1000. 
158. Id. at 1038. 
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For most parents, the "rights" of parenthood leave them no 
alternative but an assumption of parental responsibility, because 
that responsibility, both by nature and by law, can be assumed 
by no one else until the parent has failed. But when state- 
enforced policies undermine traditional parental rights, those 
same policies will inevitably undermine the assumption of paren- 
tal responsibility. To undermine parental initiative would not be 
wise because our society has found no realistic alternative to it. 
The encouragement of parental responsibility for children is cer- 
tainly less detrimental than a pervasive state assumption of 
child-rearing. Indeed, the development of policies that encourage 
parental responsibility is probably the best thing we could do for 
our children. One might even say that children have a right to 
such policies. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The individual tradition is a t  the heart of American culture. 
Yet the fulfillment of individualism's promise of personal liberty 
depends, paradoxically, upon the maintenance of a set of corol- 
lary traditions that require what may seem to be the opposite 
of personal liberty: submission to authority, acceptance of re- 
sponsibility, and the discharge of duty. The family tradition is 
among the most essential corollaries to the individual tradition, 
because it is in families that both children and parents experience 
the need for and the value of authority, responsibility, and duty 
in their most pristine forms. When individualism breaks loose 
from its corollaries, however, its tendency to destroy personal 
fulfillment and human relationships is exposed. This result was 
anticipated in the infancy of the American democratic experi- 
ment by Alexis de Tocqueville: 
As social conditions become more equal, the number of per- 
sons increases who, although they are neither rich nor powerful 
enough to exercise any great influence over their fellows, have 
nevertheless acquired or retained sufficient education and for- 
tune to satisfy their own wants. They owe nothing to any man, 
they expect nothing from any man; they acquire the habit of 
always considering themselves as standing alone, and they are 
apt to imagine that their whole destiny is in their own hands. 
Thus, not only does democracy make every man forget his 
ancestors, but it hides his descendants and separates his con- 
temporaries from him; it throws him back forever upon himself 
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alone, and threatens in the end to confine him entirely within 
the solitude of his own heart.159 
Perhaps it is no coincidence that the recent period of expansive 
egalitarianism is also the period of the most widespread loneliness 
and alienation Western culture has known. I t  may also be that 
the tendency of democracy to make men forget both their ances- 
tors and their descendants is causing some adults to seek the 
liberation of children as a way of liberating themselves from the 
duties, the ambiguities, and the self-denial that are necessarily 
required of parents and communities committed to the pattern 
of family life.lBO 
But individualism must remain embedded in the context of 
its corollary obligations to family and community if the individ- 
ual tradition itself is to survive in a meaningful form. Family life, 
rather than subjecting the young to the permanent disadvantages 
caused by certain unfair discriminations against other classes, 
has served to nurture children's readiness for responsible partici- 
pation in the individual tradition. The natural need to prepare 
children for entry into the fray of individualism, with its risks and 
obligations as well as  its opportunities, has, until the last decade, 
kept children within the walls of the family tradition. We may 
now be on the verge of seeing a rejuvenated egalitarian movement 
break down those walls. To date, however, there is no serious 
evidence that society has outgrown the need for the preparatory 
role of the family tradition, nor has industrial society discovered 
substitute institutions or relationships adequate to fulfill the 
functions historically performed by the family. 
Because of its preparatory role, maintenance of the family 
tradition is in fact a prerequisite to thz existence of a rational and 
productive individual tradition. John Locke concluded his discus- 
sion of the role of children in the individual tradition with this 
statement: "And thus we see how natural freedom and subjection 
to parents may consist together and are both founded on the same 
principle."l6l The principle upon which both f reed~m and subjec- 
tion to parents are founded has to do with the most fundamental 
human processes of learning. Locke believed that parents were 
obliged 'by "Nature" to "nourish and educate" children in devel- 
oping the minimal capacities one must possess before the liberty 
159. A. DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 194 (R. Heffner ed. 1956). 
160. Novak, The Family Out of Favor, HARPER'S, April 1976, a t  37. 
161. LOCKE, SUPM note 14, 9 61, a t  35. 
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to make binding choices can be meaningful. The related obliga- 
tion of children is to submit to some degree of parental authority; 
otherwise, little significant learning can take place. In his impor- 
tant work on the development of individual knowledge, philoso- 
pher Michael Polanyi has pointed out that neither basic nor so- 
phisticated skills can be learned without the kind of personal 
master-apprentice relationship Locke saw as existing between 
parents and children: 
An art which cannot be specified in detail cannot be trans- 
mitted by prescription, since no prescription for it exists. It can 
be passed only by example from master to apprentice. . . . To 
learn by example is to submit to authority. You follow your 
master because you trust his manner of doing things even when 
you cannot account in detail for its effectiveness. By watching 
the master and emulating his efforts in the presence of his exam- 
ple, the apprentice unconsciously picks up the rules of the art, 
including those which are not explicitly known to the master 
himself. These hidden rules can be assimilated only by a person 
who surrenders himself to that extent uncritically to the 
imitation of another. A society which wants to preserve a fund 
of personal knowledge must submit to tradition.lfi2 
It is more than coincidental that for the ancient Greeks and 
Romans, as  well as for Western society in the post-1500 period, a 
strong commitment to the idea of childhood and lasting family 
relationships grew parallel with a strong commitment to the idea 
of e d ~ c a t i 0 n . l ~ ~  Childhood, as a time of life and as a frame of 
mind, is intimately related to educational development. 
Ardent advocates of children's rights may believe that "in 
this society . . . we are not likely to err in the direction of too 
much freedom,"164 but too much freedom can undermine and 
finally destroy the most fundamental learning processes and the 
human relationships that sustain them. To the extent that these 
relationships and processes are undetermined, it is ultimately the 
tradition of individual liberty that will be damaged. 
162. M.  POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 53 
(1964). 
163. See notes 25-27 and accompanying text supra. 
164. FARSON, supra note 94, at 153. 
